HSM Root Key Distribution with Trusted Node Authentication
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing key management systems in cloud environments require coordination between two nodes to maintain a root key, allowing cloud service providers access to encryption keys and compromising user control over data security.
Innovation Solution
A method for securely distributing a root key within an HSM cluster using ephemeral keys, ensuring user ownership and control by authenticating each node as a trusted destination, preventing cloud service providers from accessing data.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If coordination between two nodes is used to maintain a root key, then cloud service providers can access encryption keys, but user control over data security is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the root key management by distributing it across multiple HSM nodes in a cluster, where each node holds a portion of the key material. This segmentation prevents any single node or cloud service provider from accessing the complete encryption key, thereby maintaining user control while enabling distributed access management.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary key ceremony process that mediates between the user and the HSM cluster. This intermediary mechanism allows users to provision and manage root keys without direct cloud provider access, acting as a trusted mediator that preserves user control while enabling cloud-based encryption operations.
2Reliability
If a root key is generated outside the key management service, then user ownership is achieved, but physical security and process management burden increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements self-service by enabling users to generate and provision root keys through automated key ceremony processes that run within the HSM cluster environment. This eliminates the need for users to manually manage physical security of external key generation systems, as the HSM cluster itself provides the secure key generation capability.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces the mechanical physical security system (external key generation devices, physical key storage) with a digital/crypto-based system using HSMs and cryptographic key ceremonies. This substitution eliminates physical security concerns while maintaining user ownership through cryptographic control mechanisms.
3Productivity
If cloud service providers access encryption keys, then key management service functionality is enabled, but data security is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments encryption key management across multiple HSM nodes, where each node processes only a portion of key operations. This segmentation enables the key management service to function distributedly while preventing any single cloud service provider component from accessing complete encryption keys, thereby maintaining data security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces cryptographic intermediaries (key ceremony protocols, wrapping keys, and HSM-mediated operations) that enable key management service functionality without direct cloud provider access to plaintext encryption keys. These intermediaries facilitate service operations while preserving data security through cryptographic protection.
Data Source
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AI summary
An approach is provided for distributing a root key to a hardware security module (HSM) of an HSM cluster. A signed first command is transmitted to a source HSM to create a master key. A fingerprint of the master key is received in a response signed by the source HSM using a module signing key hardcoded into the source HSM at manufacturing time. A second command is transmitted to a first HSM to generate an importer key pair. A request is transmitted to the source HSM to create and export a wrapped master key. The master key wrapped with a transport key is received. The wrapped master key is transmitted to the first HSM. The master key is activated in the first HSM.