Secure Key Exchange Using HSM Seed Derivation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional key management systems face challenges in securely establishing and managing transaction keys for electronic transactions, particularly in preventing the exposure of cleartext keys, which are vulnerable to hacking and compromise the confidentiality of data.

Innovation Solution

A method utilizing a hardware security module (HSM) to generate and manage master key encryption keys and HMAC keys, encrypting the HMAC key to create a cryptogram, and transmitting this cryptogram to an entity computing system for secure storage and use in deriving a transaction key without exposing cleartext keys, ensuring secure key exchange and protection of transactions.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If conventional key management systems are used to establish and manage transaction keys, then key exchange can be performed, but cleartext keys are exposed and vulnerable to hacking

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity of key exchangeVSAvoidexposure of cleartext keys to hacking
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the cleartext key from the key exchange process by using a key derivation function. Instead of transmitting the actual key in cleartext form, the system transmits only a seed value that can be used to derive the key locally. This extraction eliminates the security vulnerability of cleartext key exposure while maintaining the functionality of key exchange.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces a key derivation function as an intermediary between the seed value and the transaction key. This intermediary process transforms the transmitted seed into the actual key without ever exposing the key itself during transmission. The key derivation function acts as a mediator that protects the key material while enabling its use in transactions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If initial keys are manually installed in field devices such as ATMs and POS terminals, then key establishment is achieved, but the process is labor-intensive and difficult to manage

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvekey establishmentVSAvoidlabor intensity of key installation
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

The patent enables key establishment through self-service by allowing devices to automatically derive their own transaction keys using a key derivation function and a transmitted seed value. Instead of requiring manual key installation by technicians, the system automatically generates keys locally at each device, eliminating labor-intensive field operations while maintaining secure key establishment.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Ease of operation

If cleartext keys are transmitted for key exchange, then key establishment is simplified, but security is compromised due to vulnerability to hacking

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesimplicity of key exchangeVSAvoidconfidentiality of data
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent changes the parameter being transmitted from a cleartext key to a seed value. This parameter change maintains the simplicity of key exchange (as the seed is still transmitted and processed automatically) while improving security (as the seed cannot be directly used to compromise system security in the same way a cleartext key could). The transformation preserves operational simplicity while enhancing confidentiality.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS11936776B2Secure key exchange electronic transactions
Publication Date: 2024.03.19 WELLS FARGO BANK NA
  • US11936776B2 patent drawing
  • US11936776B2 patent drawing
  • US11936776B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A unique transaction key (Tk) is established amongst multiple entities using a common hardware security module (HSM) with a common HMAC key (HK) and transaction scheme name (T). The transaction key (Tk) can be used for various cryptographic functions (e.g. encryption, MAC, HMAC, key management) with one or more messages at the transaction or session level.