HSM Seed Splitting for Secure Cryptocurrency Key Backup

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Current wallet and key management systems for secure cryptocurrencies face security threats due to the risk of private keys being stolen during key generation, backup, and restore operations, as they rely on software-based Transaction Signing Servers without strict physical boundaries, and traditional backup methods are vulnerable to theft and memory attacks.

Innovation Solution

The Seed Splitting and Firmware Extension for Secure Cryptocurrency Key Backup, Restore, and Transaction Signing Platform uses FIPS 140-2 certified hardware security modules (HSMs) to split Bitcoin master private keys into shares, implementing M-of-N authentication and secure firmware transaction signing within tamper-proof storage to protect keys from physical and software theft, and distributes seed shares geographically for secure backup and recovery.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If software-based Transaction Signing Servers are used for key management, then ease of operation is improved, but security is worsened due to lack of physical boundaries and vulnerability to memory attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveease of operationVSAvoidsecurity
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the master private key into multiple key shares using secret sharing schemes (e.g., Shamir's Secret Sharing). These key shares are distributed across multiple HSMs, so that no single point contains the complete key. This segmentation prevents memory attacks and theft while maintaining operational capability through distributed reconstruction of the key when needed.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces HSMs as intermediary devices that provide tamper-proof storage and processing. The HSMs act as mediators between the software application and the cryptographic keys, performing key operations within secure hardware boundaries. This intermediary layer protects against software-based attacks while maintaining operational functionality.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Ease of manufacture

If traditional backup methods are used for key storage, then ease of manufacture is improved, but security is worsened due to vulnerability to theft and memory attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveease of manufactureVSAvoidsecurity
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of manufactureVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The backup system segments the master key into multiple key shares that are distributed to different HSMs and/or physical locations. This segmentation makes theft of complete key material significantly more difficult while maintaining the ability to restore keys through coordinated access to the distributed shares.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent extends the backup system into multiple spatial dimensions by distributing key shares across different geographic locations and physical HSM devices. This spatial distribution adds a dimensional layer of security where an attacker would need to compromise multiple physically separated systems simultaneously.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #17Another dimension (Dimensionality change)

3Ease of operation

If master private keys are stored in centralized location, then ease of operation is improved, but security is worsened due to single point of failure and theft risk

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveease of operationVSAvoidtheft risk
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The centralized master key is segmented into distributed key shares stored across multiple HSMs. This segmentation eliminates the single point of failure while maintaining operational ease through automated key reconstruction processes that occur transparently when needed.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

Different key shares are stored with different security characteristics and access controls in local HSMs. Each HSM provides localized security properties (tamper-proof storage, secure enclaves) while the collective system provides distributed security. This local quality approach allows each component to be optimized for its specific security requirements.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

4Reliability

If HSMs with tamper-proof storage are used, then security is improved, but device complexity is worsened due to hardware requirements

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoiddevice complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The HSMs are designed to perform multiple functions: key generation, key storage, key operations (signing, encryption), and secure key sharing. This multi-functionality reduces the need for separate dedicated hardware components for each cryptographic operation, thereby managing complexity while maintaining high security standards.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Data Source

PatentUS10778439B2Seed splitting and firmware extension for secure cryptocurrency key backup, restore, and transaction signing platform apparatuses, methods and systems
Publication Date: 2020.09.15 FMR CORP
  • US10778439B2 patent drawing
  • US10778439B2 patent drawing
  • US10778439B2 patent drawing

AI summary

The Seed Splitting and Firmware Extension for Secure Cryptocurrency Key Backup, Restore, and Transaction Signing Platform Apparatuses, Methods and Systems (“SFTSP”) transforms transaction signing request, key backup request, key recovery request inputs via SFTSP components into transaction signing response, key backup response, key recovery response outputs. A transaction signing request message for a transaction is received by a first HSM and includes an encrypted second master key share from a second HSM whose access is controlled by M-of-N authentication policy. The encrypted second master key share is decrypted. A first master key share is retrieved. A master private key is recovered from the master key shares. A transaction hash and a keychain path is determined. A signing private key for the keychain path is generated using the recovered master private key. The transaction hash is signed using the signing private key, and the generated signature is returned.