Hardware Security Module Message Authentication via Segmented Verification

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing methods for checking incoming messages in vehicle systems, particularly those related to safety-relevant components, often require redundant checks and additional hardware enhancements, which can increase complexity and burden on hardware security modules (HSMs).

Innovation Solution

The method utilizes a Message Authentication Code (MAC) to check the authenticity and integrity of incoming messages, eliminating the need for double MAC checks by the HSM and reducing the computational burden. This is achieved by performing the authentication on the functional level and the function check on the monitoring level, using continuous monitoring of the HSM to ensure its correct operation.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If double MAC checks are performed by the HSM for all received safety-relevant messages, then the authenticity and integrity of messages are verified, but the computational burden on the HSM increases excessively

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemessage authenticationVSAvoidHSM computational burden
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The verification process is segmented into two levels: functional level (L1) performs MAC verification for quality standards, while monitoring level (L2) performs MAC verification for safety standards. This segmentation distributes the computational burden across different processing levels rather than concentrating all verification tasks on the HSM.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent applies partial verification by selecting which messages require full MAC verification based on their safety relevance. Not all incoming messages undergo the same level of scrutiny - only those marked as safety-relevant undergo L2 monitoring level verification, while others are handled at the L1 functional level only.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

2Reliability

If redundant checks and additional hardware enhancements are implemented, then functional security is improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvefunctional securityVSAvoidhardware architecture
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The HSM is designed to perform multiple functions: it generates MACs for message authentication, verifies MACs for integrity checking, and participates in both functional level and monitoring level verification processes. This multi-functionality eliminates the need for separate dedicated hardware components for each verification task.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary verification mechanism where the L1 functional level performs preliminary MAC verification, and only messages passing this initial check proceed to L2 monitoring level verification. This intermediary step filters out obviously compromised messages before they reach the more resource-intensive L2 verification process.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS12278906B2Method and device for checking an incoming secured, encrypted message
Publication Date: 2025.04.15 ROBERT BOSCH GMBH
  • US12278906B2 patent drawing
  • US12278906B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method for checking an incoming message. In the method, based on the message authentication code, an authentication of the useful data is performed by a hardware security module and the hardware security module is subjected to a function check.