HSS Diameter Message Validation for Roaming Security
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Solution Overview
Problem
In 4G mobile communication networks, the communication security between MME and HSS is compromised due to potential signaling attacks when they belong to different operators, as attackers can modify Diameter protocol messages, leading to security risks such as denial-of-service attacks and user disconnection.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a signaling attack prevention method where the HSS or edge node validates characteristic parameters of Diameter request messages, specifically checking the source IP address, mobility management entity origin realm name, origin host name, and visited PLMN ID, and discarding or responding with an error code if they are invalid, thereby preventing attacks from unauthorized roaming interfaces.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the HSS or edge node validates characteristic parameters of Diameter request messages from roaming interfaces, then communication security is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by pre-configuring valid characteristic parameter values (source IP addresses, origin realm names, origin host names, visited PLMN IDs) in the HSS or edge node before operation. When a Diameter request message arrives, the system simply checks whether the message parameters match the pre-configured valid values, rather than performing complex real-time analysis. This preliminary preparation of validation criteria resolves the contradiction by making the security validation process straightforward and efficient.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the validation approach from complex behavioral analysis to simple parameter matching. By focusing on specific characteristic parameters (source IP address, origin realm name, origin host name, visited PLMN ID) and comparing them against pre-configured valid values, the system transforms a potentially complex security validation problem into a simple parameter equality check. This parameter-based approach improves security while maintaining low device complexity.
2Reliability
If the HSS or edge node discards invalid Diameter request messages, then signaling attack prevention is improved, but loss of information increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by performing validation only on specific characteristic parameters (source IP address, origin realm name, origin host name, visited PLMN ID) of Diameter request messages from roaming interfaces, rather than validating all messages or all parameters universally. This localized validation approach prevents signaling attacks by checking only the relevant parameters that attackers would need to forge, while avoiding false rejection of legitimate messages that might differ in other non-critical parameters.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses pre-configured valid parameter values as an intermediary reference for validation. Instead of directly comparing messages against complex attack patterns or requiring real-time authentication of every parameter, the system uses the pre-configured valid values (authorized IP addresses, registered realm names, etc.) as a trusted intermediary reference. Messages are validated by checking whether their parameters match this intermediary reference, which reduces false positives while maintaining attack prevention.
Data Source
AI summary
A signaling attack prevention method and apparatus is provided. The signaling attack prevention method can include receiving a Diameter request message sent by a mobility management entity (MME) or a serving general packet radio service (GPRS) support node (SGSN); and determining whether the Diameter request message is received through a roaming interface. When the Diameter request message is received from the roaming interface, the signaling attack prevention method can include determining whether a characteristic parameter of the Diameter request message is valid; and if the characteristic parameter of the Diameter request message is invalid, the method can include discarding Diameter request message or returning, to the MME or the SGSN, a Diameter response message carrying an error code. In this way, a hacker can be effectively prevented from attacking an HSS or an edge node by using each attack path, and communication security is improved.