HTTP Request Transport With DPoP-Based Selective Encryption
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing identity management systems face challenges in securely exchanging data across untrusted Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections, particularly due to vulnerabilities like certificate injection attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks, which compromise data integrity and security.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a proof-of-possession (DPoP) protocol for implicit key exchange between clients and servers, where clients and servers encrypt data using each other's public keys, ensuring only the intended recipient can decrypt it, thereby enhancing security and reducing unnecessary encryption overhead.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional TLS connections are used for data exchange between client and server, then basic transport security is provided, but the system remains vulnerable to certificate injection attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces DPoP tokens as an intermediary mechanism between the client and server. These tokens serve as mediators that carry cryptographic proofs of possession, enabling the parties to verify each other's identity without directly trusting the TLS connection. The token acts as a trusted intermediary that binds the cryptographic keys to the authentication process, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks even when TLS is compromised.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements preliminary cryptographic key exchange and proof-of-possession verification before the actual data exchange occurs. The client and server establish DPoP tokens and verify each other's identity in advance, creating a secure foundation before sensitive operations begin. This preliminary authentication ensures that even if subsequent TLS connections are intercepted, the attackers cannot impersonate either party.
2Reliability
If full encryption is applied to all data sections, then security is enhanced, but processing overhead increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies encryption selectively rather than uniformly to all data. Specifically, only sensitive sections such as access tokens and authorization data are encrypted using the DPoP-established key pairs, while non-sensitive metadata and protocol information remain in plaintext. This localized application of encryption maintains security for critical information while minimizing the processing overhead associated with encrypting entire data streams.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements partial encryption by encrypting only the necessary sensitive portions of the data exchange rather than applying full encryption to all communications. The DPoP mechanism enables selective encryption of access tokens and authorization data, achieving sufficient security with reduced computational overhead compared to comprehensive encryption of all message content.
3Reliability
If DPoP protocol with implicit key exchange is implemented, then security against unauthorized access is significantly enhanced, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent makes the DPoP token mechanism universal and multi-functional. The same token structure serves multiple purposes: it carries the proof-of-possession cryptographic signature, it binds the client's identity to the authentication process, it enables selective encryption of sensitive data, and it provides the basis for verifying server identity. This multi-functionality reduces the need for separate mechanisms and simplifies the overall system architecture despite the advanced cryptography involved.
Data Source
AI summary
A method for message encryption between a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) server and a client device is described. The method may include generating, by the client device, a demonstration of proof-of-possession (DPoP) including a signature of a first public key of a first keypair associated with the HTTP server, where the HTTP server has a first private key of the first keypair. The client device may transmit, to the HTTP server, a request including the DPoP of the client device. The HTTP server may transmit a response based on receiving the request, where the response includes an indication that one or more sections of the response are encrypted using a second public key of a second keypair of the client device, where the client device has a second private key of the second keypair. The client device may decrypt the response using the second private key.