Hydrogen Refueling Station Control System Segmentation
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Current control systems for hydrogen refueling stations lack comprehensive solutions for implementation issues, faults at system levels, and effective control strategies in faulty situations, which can lead to safety hazards during hydrogen refueling.
Innovation Solution
A control system for hydrogen refueling stations that incorporates a process controller and a safety controller with independent microprocessors, where the safety controller monitors critical parameters and can override the process controller to immediately stop operations in hazardous situations, using final safety elements such as valves to prevent escalation of risks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a single centralized control system is used for HRS operations, then the control architecture is simple and cost-effective, but the system reliability and safety are reduced when faults occur at system level
Solution Approach 1:
The control system is segmented into two independent controllers: a process controller for normal operations and a safety controller for hazard monitoring. This segmentation allows each controller to specialize in its function, improving overall system reliability while maintaining manageable complexity through clear functional separation.
Solution Approach 2:
The safety controller acts as an intermediary between the process controller and the final safety elements. It receives process data, independently evaluates safety conditions, and can override the process controller to activate safety measures, providing a mediating layer that enhances reliability without requiring complete system redesign.
2Reliability
If comprehensive safety monitoring is implemented across all process functions, then the safety coverage is maximized, but the number of safety instrumented functions increases system complexity and cost
Solution Approach 1:
Safety monitoring is applied locally to only those process functions that can lead to hazardous situations. The safety controller selectively monitors critical parameters (temperature, pressure, flow) rather than all process variables, providing adequate safety coverage while avoiding unnecessary complexity from monitoring non-critical functions.
Solution Approach 2:
The safety controller implements partial monitoring by focusing on the most critical safety parameters rather than comprehensive monitoring of all process functions. This partial action approach provides sufficient safety coverage for hazard prevention while keeping the safety instrumented system complexity manageable.
3Speed
If the process controller handles all control functions including safety, then the control logic is centralized and simpler to implement, but the system cannot respond rapidly to hazardous situations caused by controller faults
Solution Approach 1:
The control architecture is segmented into process control and safety control functions executed by separate controllers. This segmentation enables the safety controller to independently evaluate safety conditions and respond to hazards without being constrained by process control logic, achieving rapid safety response while maintaining acceptable architectural complexity through modular design.
Data Source
Figure 1~2
Figure 3
Figure 4A~4B
AI summary
The invention relates to a HRS for filling a vessel of a vehicle with hydrogen, the HRS 1 comprising: a basic process control system comprising a process controller, a plurality of process measuring devices, a plurality of final process elements and a plurality of associated basic process control functions facilitating monitoring and controlling the operation of the HRS, wherein the HRS further comprises a safety instrumented system comprising a safety controller, a plurality of safety measuring devices, a plurality of final safety elements a plurality of associated safety instrumented functions, wherein at least one of the final process elements and the final safety elements facilitates tripping the operation of the HRS under the control of the associated process controller or the associated safety controller respectively.