Hydrogen Refueling Control Architecture With Separate Safety Channels
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Solution Overview
Problem
Hydrogen Refueling Stations (HRS) face challenges in maintaining safety and operational integrity due to the separation of dispenser and center modules, requiring effective data communication and independent control systems to prevent single-point failures and ensure safe operation.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a dual communication network with separate safety and process communication channels using PROFINET, EtherCAT, or PROFIsafe protocols, and physically separating these channels through cables or wireless means, ensuring that safety and process components operate independently and can override each other in case of hazardous conditions, while being protected from environmental and operational risks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If the dispenser module is separated from the HRS center module to resemble fossil fuel refueling stations, then the design is more practical and easier to operate, but the risk of single-point failures increases and safety monitoring becomes more difficult
Solution Approach 1:
The HRS system is divided into separate modules (center module and dispenser module) that are physically spaced 5-65 meters apart, allowing independent operation and maintenance while maintaining functional integrity through dedicated communication channels
Solution Approach 2:
A dual communication network with separate safety and process communication channels acts as an intermediary between the center module and dispenser module, ensuring that control and monitoring signals can be transmitted reliably while maintaining safety isolation
2Device complexity
If a single communication channel is used between center module and dispenser module, then the system is simpler and cheaper, but the risk of data loss and control failure increases
Solution Approach 1:
The communication network is segmented into two independent channels: a safety communication channel for critical control and monitoring signals, and a process communication channel for operational data, eliminating single-point failure risks
Solution Approach 2:
Different communication protocols and priorities are assigned to different channels - the safety channel uses high-priority protocols for critical signals while the process channel handles operational data, optimizing each channel for its specific function
3Device complexity
If the safety controller and process controller are integrated in the same enclosure, then the system is more compact and easier to maintain, but the risk of common-mode failures increases
Solution Approach 1:
The control system is divided into separate safety controller and process controller units with independent microprocessors and enclosures, ensuring that failures in one controller do not propagate to the other while maintaining coordinated control functions
Data Source
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Figure 2
Figure 3~4
AI summary
A HRS 1 comprising at least a HRS center module, a HRS dispenser module and a first hydrogen supply line facilitating flow of hydrogen between the HRS center module and the HRS dispenser module, the HRS center module comprises a safety controller and a process controller, wherein data is communicated between the safety controller and safety components of the HRS dispenser module via a safety communication channel, and wherein data is communicated between the process controller and process components of the HRS dispenser module via a process communication channel.