Hypervisor Keystore for Secure VM Boot Key Isolation
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Solution Overview
Problem
In cloud-based environments, managing encryption keys is challenging due to their sensitive nature, making it difficult to access them securely while isolating them from unauthorized consumers, especially in virtual machines where data dumps can expose keys, and specialized hardware is expensive and hard to use.
Innovation Solution
A hypervisor-based keystore that provides access to thousands of virtual machines, isolating keys between VMs and users, allowing for secure boot processes using asymmetric and symmetric keys, and supporting replication and consistency protocols for key management.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If encryption keys are stored in virtual machines, then key accessibility is improved, but security deteriorates due to data dump exposure risks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts encryption keys from virtual machine storage and places them in a separate, dedicated keystore component. This physical and logical separation removes keys from the vulnerable VM environment where data dumps can occur, while maintaining controlled access through the hypervisor interface.
Solution Approach 2:
The hypervisor acts as an intermediary layer between the keystore and virtual machines. It controls and mediates all key access requests, providing authenticated access to authorized VMs while preventing unauthorized access and isolation breaches, thus maintaining both security and accessibility.
2Reliability
If specialized hardware is used for key storage, then security is improved, but device complexity and cost increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent creates a virtual representation of secure hardware storage through the hypervisor-based keystore. Instead of requiring physical hardware security modules for each VM, it virtualizes the secure storage function, allowing multiple VMs to access encrypted key storage through software-based security controls.
Solution Approach 2:
The hypervisor-based keystore serves multiple virtual machines simultaneously, providing a universal key storage solution. A single keystore infrastructure supports numerous VMs with isolated key spaces, eliminating the need for separate hardware security modules for each virtual machine while maintaining security boundaries.
3Reliability
If keys are isolated between VMs, then security is improved, but key management complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The keystore is segmented into isolated key spaces for each virtual machine, with each VM having its own dedicated key storage partition. The hypervisor enforces these segmentation boundaries, ensuring that keys from one VM cannot be accessed by another VM, thereby providing strong isolation while managing complexity through centralized control.
4Reliability
If early boot access to keys is provided, then boot security is improved, but access control complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The keystore is initialized and made available during the early boot process, before the virtual machine operating system is fully loaded. This preliminary setup allows cryptographic keys to be accessed for secure boot verification and encrypted disk decryption before other system components are active, ensuring security is established from the outset.
Data Source
AI summary
An embodiment includes executing, by a hypervisor, a bootloader with access to a first logical partition of a non-volatile memory, the first logical partition storing a keystore. The embodiment also includes loading, by the bootloader, a kernel with access to the first logical partition of the non-volatile memory. The embodiment also includes receiving, by the bootloader, an encryption key from the keystore. The embodiment also includes performing, by the bootloader, a cryptographic algorithm using the encryption key on the kernel. The embodiment also includes executing, by the bootloader in an event that the performing of the cryptographic algorithm produces a first result, the kernel with access to the first logical partition of the non-volatile memory. The embodiment also includes halting, by the bootloader in an event that the performing of the cryptographic algorithm fails to produce the first result, booting of the kernel and generating an error message.