Hypervisor System Call Interception for Exploit Detection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional malware detection methods, particularly in virtualized environments, face challenges in providing robust protection against malicious attacks due to the limitations of kernel hooking, which can be bypassed by exploits, and the need for more effective exploit detection mechanisms.
Innovation Solution
A hypervisor-controlled threat detection system that intercepts and analyzes system calls within a guest operating system kernel, using breakpoints to divert control to exploit detection logic during execute cycles while maintaining uninterrupted access during read cycles, thereby enhancing detection capabilities without being detectable by guest applications.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Measurement precision
If kernel hooking is used to intercept system calls for malware detection, then detection capability is improved, but reliability deteriorates because exploits can detect and bypass the hook through hook hopping
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a hypervisor as an intermediary layer between the guest OS and the exploitation target. The hypervisor intercepts system calls at the hardware virtualization level, preventing direct kernel hooking while maintaining detection capability. This intermediary approach eliminates the reliability issue of kernel hooking being detectable by exploits, as the interception occurs in a privileged layer that exploits cannot easily access or modify.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent transitions the detection mechanism from the guest OS kernel space to the hypervisor space, effectively moving to another dimension of system architecture. By implementing system call interception in the hypervisor layer rather than in the guest kernel, the solution achieves detection capability while avoiding the limitations and vulnerabilities of traditional kernel hooking methods.
2Reliability
If system call interception is implemented to detect exploits, then security protection is improved, but device complexity increases due to additional virtualization layer requirements
Solution Approach 1:
The hypervisor serves multiple functions simultaneously: it provides virtualization services for running guest OSes, implements security monitoring through system call interception, and enables exploit detection without requiring separate dedicated security infrastructure. This multi-functionality reduces the need for additional complex components while achieving enhanced security protection.
3Measurement precision
If breakpoints are inserted in system calls for monitoring, then exploit detection precision is improved, but productivity deteriorates due to potential interruption of normal system operations
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements dynamic control over breakpoint insertion and removal in system calls. The hypervisor can selectively activate monitoring for specific system calls based on detected threats, and suspend or remove breakpoints when not needed. This dynamic approach ensures high detection precision when exploits are present while minimizing interference with normal system operations during clean states, thereby maintaining productivity.
Data Source
AI summary
A computing device is described that comprises one or more hardware processors and a memory communicatively coupled to the one or more hardware processors. The memory comprises software that, when executed by the processors, operates as (i) a virtual machine and (ii) a hypervisor. The virtual machine includes a guest kernel that facilitates communications between a guest application being processed within the virtual machine and one or more virtual resources. The hypervisor configures a portion of the guest kernel to intercept a system call from the guest application and redirect information associated with the system call to the hypervisor. The hypervisor enables logic within the guest kernel to analyze information associated with the system call to determine whether the system call is associated with a malicious attack in response to the system call being initiated during a memory page execution cycle. Alternatively, the hypervisor operates to obfuscate interception of the system call in response to the system call being initiated during memory page read cycle.