Hypervisor Secure VM Memory Encryption

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

In virtualized environments, the security of access to memory allocated to virtual machines (VMs) is compromised due to the ease of creating VMs without adequate consideration for disk space, leading to potential security threats from storing sensitive information on disk.

Innovation Solution

Implementing encrypted memory locations managed by a hypervisor, where access is secured by allocating and decrypting memory spaces specifically for authorized applications, using a single hypervisor for encryption and decryption, and preventing unauthorized access through operating system controls and APIs.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Productivity

If VMs store sensitive information in main memory during execution, then operational performance is improved, but security is compromised when memory is stored on disk

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveoperational performanceVSAvoidsecurity threats
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments memory access into two types: normal unencrypted memory access for operational performance and encrypted memory access for security-critical data. The hypervisor creates separate encrypted memory regions that are only accessible to authorized applications, allowing the system to maintain both performance and security by using the appropriate memory type for different workloads.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The hypervisor acts as an intermediary between the VM and the disk storage. It intercepts memory write operations, encrypts sensitive data before storing it on disk, and decrypts it during read operations. This intermediary layer ensures that sensitive information is never stored in plaintext on disk while maintaining operational performance through efficient encryption/decryption mechanisms.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Adaptability or versatility

If hypervisor provides snapshot and clone capabilities, then versatility is improved, but security of stored memory is compromised

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesnapshot and clone capabilityVSAvoidsecurity threats
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary encryption of memory data before creating snapshots or clones. The hypervisor encrypts sensitive information in advance and stores only the encrypted versions in snapshot files. When restoring from snapshots, the data is automatically decrypted. This preliminary action ensures that even if snapshot files are accessed unauthorizedly, the sensitive information remains protected.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Ease of operation

If disk space is allocated without careful consideration, then ease of operation is improved, but security of memory access is compromised

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveease of VM creationVSAvoidsecurity threats
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The hypervisor provides self-service security features that automatically encrypt memory data without requiring manual configuration from administrators. When a VM is created or restarted, the hypervisor automatically identifies sensitive memory regions, encrypts them using keys stored in secure locations, and manages the encryption lifecycle. This self-service approach maintains ease of operation while implementing robust security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS9710400B2Secure virtual machine memory
Publication Date: 2017.07.18 MICRO FOCUS LLC
  • US9710400B2 patent drawing
  • US9710400B2 patent drawing
  • US9710400B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Apparatus, systems, and methods may operate to restore an operational state of an associated virtual machine (VM) using encrypted information stored in encrypted memory locations. A single hypervisor may be used to encrypt and decrypt the information. Access may be permitted to a designated number of the encrypted memory locations only to a single application executed by the associated VM subject to the hypervisor. Access may be denied to any other application executed by the associated VM, or any other VM.