Tamper-Resistant IC Card Secure Element Segmentation
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Solution Overview
Problem
The integration of SIM cards into electronic devices through soldering, while enhancing miniaturization and security, poses challenges for operator changes and device repair, necessitating a solution for managing and accessing telecommunication and application profiles securely and separately within a tamper-resistant device.
Innovation Solution
A tamper-resistant device with separate security domains for telecommunication and application profiles, utilizing distinct physical interfaces for access, enabling secure and isolated management of profiles through a single tamper-resistant platform that integrates both functionalities, ensuring non-interference between telecommunication and payment services.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If SIM card is soldered into the hosting device, then miniaturization and robustness are improved, but operator change capability and device repairability deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The SIM card is divided into two separate but integrated components: a soldered secure element containing security domains and cryptographic keys, and a removable UICC card containing application profiles. This segmentation allows the secure element to remain permanently soldered for robustness while the UICC can be removed for operator changes, resolving the contradiction between reliability and adaptability.
2Object-affected harmful factors
If SIM card is made hardly accessible through soldering, then antitheft protection is improved, but access for device repairing and operator change deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
By separating the secure element (soldered, hard to access) from the UICC (removable, easy to access), the system provides strong antitheft protection through the soldered secure element while maintaining ease of repair and operator change through the removable UICC component.
Solution Approach 2:
The UICC card is extracted as a separate removable component from the soldered secure element, allowing it to be easily removed for repair and operator change operations without affecting the permanently attached secure element that provides antitheft protection.
3Device complexity
If multiple profiles are stored in a single security domain, then device complexity is reduced, but security isolation between telecommunication and payment services deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The security domains are segmented into separate logical units within the secure element: a first security domain for telecommunication profiles and a second security domain for payment profiles. This segmentation provides security isolation between different service types while maintaining a single integrated secure element device.
Solution Approach 2:
Different security domains within the secure element have specialized local qualities: the first security domain is optimized for telecommunication services with appropriate access controls, while the second security domain is optimized for payment services with its own security policies. Each domain has tailored security characteristics suited to its specific function.
4Reliability
If separate physical interfaces are used for telecommunication and payment profiles, then security isolation is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
A single physical interface (such as SPI or I2C) serves multiple functions by communicating with different security domains within the secure element. The interface can selectively access the first security domain for telecommunication profiles or the second security domain for payment profiles, providing security isolation through logical addressing rather than physical separation.
Data Source
AI summary
A tamper resistant device can be used for an integrated circuit card. The device includes memory storing a first security domain that includes a telecommunication profile and a second security domain that includes an application profile. A first physical interface is configured to be coupled to a baseband processor configured to operate with a mobile telecommunications network. A second physical interface configured to be coupled to an application processor. The first physical interface configured to allow the baseband processor to access the telecommunication profile and the second physical interface is configured to allow the application processor to access the application profile. The tamper resistant device is configured to enable accessibility to the application profile if corresponding commands are received at the first interface and to enable accessibility to the telecommunication profile if corresponding commands are received at the second interface.


