Integrated Circuit Protection Against Time Attacks

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Solution Overview

Problem

Integrated circuits face effective attacks through hidden channels, such as time attacks, which exploit consumption and electromagnetic radiation patterns to detect sensitive operations, and existing countermeasures like hardware and software solutions are either localized or incompatible with flash memory operations.

Innovation Solution

A protection module that regularly modifies the configuration of a hardware function, such as the clock signal of a processing unit, by sequentially selecting from a set of configurations with varying application durations, using a random mask to scramble and desynchronize operations, ensuring compatibility with flash memory operations.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If the configuration of a hardware function is regularly modified with varying application durations using random masks, then the circuit becomes resistant to time attacks and hidden channel analysis, but the device complexity increases due to the protection module requiring multiple configurations and control mechanisms

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against time attacksVSAvoidprotection module structure
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements dynamic configuration switching where the hardware function's configuration is regularly modified during operation. A control circuit selectively applies different configurations from a set of predefined configurations, with each configuration having a varying application duration. This dynamic reconfiguration prevents attackers from establishing consistent temporal patterns, thereby countering time attacks while managing complexity through structured configuration sets.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The protection mechanism employs periodic reconfiguration where the configuration of the hardware function is changed at regular intervals. The control circuit cycles through multiple configurations with varying durations, creating a periodic pattern that masks the underlying operational timing. This periodic action disrupts hidden channel analysis by preventing continuous observation of stable temporal patterns.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #19Periodic action

2Object-affected harmful factors

If configurations are applied with varying durations selected from a set, then the operational patterns are masked to prevent time attacks, but the loss of time occurs due to frequent reconfiguration and varying application durations

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvevulnerability to time attacksVSAvoidreconfiguration overhead
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

Multiple configurations are pre-defined and stored in a configuration set before operation begins. Each configuration includes predetermined parameters and associated application durations. The control circuit selects from these pre-prepared configurations, eliminating the need for real-time configuration generation and reducing the time penalty associated with frequent reconfiguration.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent changes operational parameters by switching between different configurations, each with distinct parameter sets. The control circuit varies the application duration of each configuration selected from the set, creating parameter variations that mask temporal patterns. This approach achieves security through parameter diversity while managing time loss by using predefined parameter sets.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS10614217B2Scrambling of the operation of an integrated circuit
Publication Date: 2020.04.07 STMICROELECTRONICS INT NV
  • US10614217B2 patent drawing
  • US10614217B2 patent drawing

AI summary

An integrated circuit includes functional circuitry such as a processing core, memory interfaces, cryptographic circuitry, etc. The integrated circuit also includes protection circuitry to protect the functional circuitry of the integrated circuit against attacks by hidden channels. The protection circuitry, for each of a series of successive periods of time, selects a configuration of the functional circuitry from a set of configurations of the functional circuitry, sets a duration of the period of time, and applies the selected configuration of the functional circuitry for the set duration of the period of time.