IC Security Module for IR Laser Probing Defense

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Solution Overview

Problem

Integrated circuits (ICs) face security threats from attackers using backside probing techniques, such as infrared laser probing, which allow observation and manipulation of internal signals, compromising data secrecy.

Innovation Solution

Incorporating a security module within the IC that modifies signals and events to make them non-deterministic relative to external events, obscuring functionality and data from external observation, particularly when using IR laser probes, through the use of pseudo-random value generators and delay chains.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If backside probing techniques are used to observe internal signals, then detailed time-varying signal information can be acquired, but security of the integrated circuit is compromised

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesignal observation detailVSAvoidsecurity vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces an intermediary layer between the internal circuit signals and the external probing interface. This intermediary modifies the signals before they reach the probed nodes, preventing direct observation of the original internal signals while still allowing functional operation of the circuit

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent changes the parameters of the signals at the probed nodes by introducing random delays and jitter. The signal timing and phase are modified so that external observers cannot correlate the probed signals with the actual internal circuit operations, thereby protecting security while maintaining measurement capability

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Measurement precision

If multiple repeated samples are taken to improve signal-to-noise ratio, then accurate waveforms can be reconstructed, but the time required for analysis increases significantly

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvewaveform accuracyVSAvoidanalysis time
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by pre-processing the signals through the security module before they reach the probed nodes. The random delay mechanisms are built into the signal path itself, so that single samples can be taken without requiring multiple repetitions, significantly reducing analysis time while maintaining signal integrity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Applied Scientific Principles

This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.

Function Achieved in This Case

Effectively protects ICs from external observation and manipulation by rendering internal events non-deterministic, enhancing security against probing attacks while allowing for disablement during testing and manufacturing.

Implementation Method 1

through the use of pseudo-random value generators and delay chains

Methodology Applied
Scientific EffectPseudo-random generation:

Implementation Method 2

Since silicon is transparent to IR light, IR lasers may be used to penetrate the back side of the IC and to probe the transistor structures within the silicon

Methodology Applied
Scientific EffectInfrared light penetration: Infrared Radiation

Data Source

PatentUS9405917B2Mechanism for protecting integrated circuits from security attacks
Publication Date: 2016.08.02 APPLE INC
  • US9405917B2 patent drawing
  • US9405917B2 patent drawing
  • US9405917B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A mechanism for protecting integrated circuits (IC) from security attacks includes an IC having components that may store one or more data items and may perform a number of functions and which produce resulting events. The IC may also include a security module that may modify signals and events provided to the components such that the resulting events are modified in a non-effectual way but that causes the events to be non-deterministic relative to an event that is external to the integrated circuit when the resulting events are viewed externally to the IC. This may result in obscuring the data, and the functions from being observed from external to the IC, particularly when using an IR laser probe.