ID Token Blocking Service for Offline Certificate Revocation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for checking and generating certificates for security tokens using ID tokens lack the ability to securely manage certificate validity and revocation without network connectivity and without compromising user data protection, especially when ID tokens are lost or stolen.
Innovation Solution
The method involves using sector-specific identifiers and separate revocation databases to ensure that only valid certificates are generated and maintained, allowing users to revoke certificates independently without network access, and preventing unauthorized use of blocked ID tokens.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If certificates are generated using ID tokens without network connectivity, then user data protection and informational self-determination are enhanced, but the ability to manage certificate validity and revocation securely is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments certificate management into two independent parts: (1) certificate generation capabilities stored locally in the ID token, and (2) revocation status checking performed separately when needed. This allows offline generation while maintaining secure revocation management through distributed revocation lists stored in both the ID token and security token.
Solution Approach 2:
The system performs preliminary actions by pre-storing revocation lists and validity information within the ID token before offline operations are needed. This enables the ID token to independently verify certificate validity and block generation from blocked tokens without requiring real-time network connectivity.
2Loss of information
If sector-specific identifiers are used to prevent linking of signatures across sectors, then user privacy is protected, but the complexity of managing multiple identifiers and their corresponding blocking databases increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system uses a universal blocking database structure that can store and manage multiple sector-specific identifiers using the same underlying data model and access mechanisms. The blocking database is designed to handle different identifier types (first sector-specific identifier for ID token blocking, second sector-specific identifier for certificate revocation) through a unified interface, reducing operational complexity despite the multi-sector nature.
3Reliability
If the ID token is blocked to prevent unauthorized use, then security is improved, but the ability to generate valid certificates for legitimate users is hindered
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements local quality by storing sector-specific blocking information directly within the ID token's memory. When a token is blocked, the blocking status is stored as a sector-specific identifier in a blocking database. The ID token can then locally verify whether it is blocked for a particular sector before allowing certificate generation, enabling fine-grained control that prevents unauthorized use while preserving legitimate access.
Data Source
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AI summary
The invention relates to a method for verifying the validity of a certificate (167) generated by an ID token (106) of a user (102) for a security token (156) of the same user (102), wherein the ID token (106) has a protected storage area (183) in which at least one first private key (182) is stored, and wherein a certificate (103) of a document PKI (300) is assigned to the ID token (106), wherein a certificate (180) of an authorization PKI (302) is assigned to and stored on the security token (156), and wherein at least one first sector-specific identifier (304) assigned to the ID token (106) is stored on the security token (156), which consists of the first private key (182) of the ID token (106) and the public sector key (176). of the security token (156) is calculatedwherein the certificate (160) of the authorization PKI (302) contains a public sector key (176) which is assigned to a sector from a plurality of predefined sectors and is identical for all security tokens of the same sector, wherein the certificate (167) generated by the ID token (106) is a certificate (167) derived from the certificate (103) of the document PKI (300) and stored on the security token (156), which contains the public sector key (176) or a cryptographically derived value thereof, wherein the procedure comprises: - executing a first database query of a first revocation database (318) by a first verification computer system (310) to determine a revocation status of the ID token (106), wherein the first revocation database (318) is configured such that the revocation status of the ID token (106) can be queried from it, - generating a first verification signal by the first verification computer system (310),which displays the result of the first database query, - Execution of a second database query of a second revocation database (328) by a second verification computer system (320) to determine a revocation status of the generated certificate (167), wherein the second revocation database (328) is configured such that the revocation status of the generated certificate (167) can be queried from it, - Generation of a second verification signal by the second verification computer system (320), which displays the result of the second database query, - Generation of a validity signal, which indicates the validity of the generated certificate (167) on the condition that the first verification signal indicates that the ID token (106) is not revoked, and the second verification signal indicates that the generated certificate (167) is not revoked.