Identity Card History Validator for Fraud Detection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing identity management systems, such as Windows CardSpace, lack a mechanism to detect fraudulent use of information cards, allowing third parties to spoof user identities and gain access to services, as there is no way to verify the legitimacy of identity information exchanges between clients and relying parties.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a verification process where clients and relying parties can agree on and compare the last time an information card was used, ensuring that only legitimate access occurs by adding the last use information to security tokens and using digital signatures to prevent tampering, thus enabling the detection of potentially fraudulent access.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If identity information is stored with an identity provider and released to service providers, then user control over information is improved, but vulnerability to spoofing and fraudulent access increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by establishing trust relationships and verifying identity card histories before service access is granted. The relying party checks the client's identity card usage history with the identity provider before allowing access, preventing fraudulent access attempts before they can compromise the system.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements feedback mechanisms where the identity provider provides information about the client's identity card usage history to the relying party. This feedback loop allows the relying party to verify whether the client is who they claim to be by checking if the identity provider recognizes the same identity card, thereby detecting potential spoofing attempts.
2Reliability
If service providers require authentication information from users, then service security is improved, but user convenience and control deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The identity provider acts as an intermediary between the user and the service provider. Instead of the user directly managing authentication credentials with each service provider, the identity provider mediates the authentication process by verifying identity cards and providing usage history, simplifying the user's authentication experience while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
The system enables self-service authentication where the client presents their own identity card to the relying party, and the relying party independently verifies it by checking with the identity provider. This eliminates the need for users to manually manage multiple usernames and passwords while maintaining strong authentication security.
3Productivity
If identity information is exchanged between client and service provider, then service access is enabled, but risk of information capture and fraud increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system extracts the critical verification element (identity card usage history) from the complete identity information exchange process. Instead of transmitting or storing sensitive identity details, the relying party only needs to check whether the identity provider recognizes the presented identity card, extracting just the essential verification data needed to prevent fraud.
Solution Approach 2:
The system performs preliminary verification by checking the identity card's usage history with the identity provider before any sensitive information is exchanged or services are provided. This preliminary check ensures that the client is legitimate before the actual service interaction begins, preventing information capture by fraudulent parties.
Data Source
AI summary
Before a relying party grants a client access to a resource, the last use of the security token by the client to access the resource of the relying party can be verified. Verification can be accomplished by comparing the last time the client sent the security token to the relying party with the last time the relying party received the security token from the client. If the last use of the security token is not verified, the possibility exists that the security token has been fraudulently used by a third party.