Incentivized Intrusion Detection System Using Smart Contracts

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current security solutions, such as detection-based and lure-based systems, fail to detect malicious activities in a timely and accurate manner, leading to delayed breach detection and high false positive rates.

Innovation Solution

An incentivized intrusion detection system that uses smart contracts and distributed ledgers to lure malicious actors into revealing their presence by offering incentives, thereby reducing detection time and improving breach alerting.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If detection-based systems are used to detect malicious actors by comparing signatures against databases, then detection capability is provided, but detection time is delayed and false positive rate is high

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection accuracyVSAvoiddetection time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

Instead of passively waiting for malicious actors to leave traces that detection systems can find, the system actively inverts the approach by placing incentives that malicious actors will seek out. This causes the actors to reveal their presence voluntarily, dramatically reducing detection time while improving accuracy by confirming actual malicious intent through their incentive-claiming actions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #13The other way round (Inversion)

Solution Approach 2:

The system converts the harmful behavior of malicious actors (their desire to exploit systems for gain) into a beneficial detection mechanism. By offering incentives that align with their motivations, the system turns their profit-seeking behavior into a self-revealing signal that enables rapid and accurate detection of genuine threats.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

2Reliability

If lure-based systems such as honeypots are used to detect malicious actors, then presence detection is achieved, but detection time is slow and costs are high

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvebreach detection accuracyVSAvoidbreach detection time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

Rather than using passive honeypots that wait for attackers to discover them, the system actively attracts attackers by placing valuable incentives throughout the network. This inversion of the lure approach causes attackers to reveal their presence much faster by actively seeking out and claiming incentives, thereby reducing detection time while maintaining high accuracy through verified claiming actions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #13The other way round (Inversion)

Solution Approach 2:

The system performs preliminary action by pre-placing incentives in strategic locations within the network before any attack occurs. These incentives are positioned in advance to attract and reveal malicious actors as soon as they infiltrate the system, enabling rapid detection without waiting for traditional honeypot discovery processes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Loss of time

If incentives are offered to malicious actors to reveal their presence, then detection time is reduced, but system complexity increases due to smart contracts and distributed ledgers

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection timeVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Loss of timeVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system introduces smart contracts as intermediaries that automatically manage incentive distribution and detection signaling. These self-executing contracts on the distributed ledger handle the complex logic of reward allocation and attacker identification, reducing the need for manual system management and offsetting the initial complexity increase with automated processes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The distributed ledger and smart contracts enable self-service operation where the system automatically detects, tracks, and rewards malicious actors without requiring continuous human intervention. The automated incentive claiming process and built-in verification mechanisms reduce operational complexity over time by eliminating manual detection and response procedures.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

4Reliability

If traditional security monitoring is used, then continuous surveillance is provided, but false positive rate is high due to overlap of malicious and benign actions

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity alert accuracyVSAvoidsecurity team efficiency
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The system converts the ambiguous behavior of security monitoring into clear, actionable signals by using incentive-claiming actions as definitive proof of malicious intent. When an actor claims an incentive, it provides unambiguous confirmation of both malicious presence and intent, eliminating false positives that plague traditional monitoring systems that must distinguish between benign and malicious activities.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements immediate feedback through the distributed ledger that automatically records and verifies incentive claiming actions. This real-time feedback mechanism provides security teams with confirmed malicious activity data, eliminating the need to analyze ambiguous monitoring signals and dramatically improving alert accuracy while reducing team workload.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS12323441B2Techniques for incentivized intrusion detection system
Publication Date: 2025.06.03 NAGRAVISION SA
  • US12323441B2 patent drawing
  • US12323441B2 patent drawing
  • US12323441B2 patent drawing

AI summary

The present disclosure relates generally to security solutions. More specifically, techniques (e.g., systems, methods, and devices) are provided to implement an incentivized-based intrusion detection system to detect malicious acts against an asset. The incentive may lure or facilitate the actor to provide information detecting malicious actions against an asset.