Integrity Verified Paths in Container Orchestration via Nonce Attestation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Cloud-native and container-orchestration systems, such as Kubernetes, face security vulnerabilities due to compromised network paths between entities, which can lead to integrity issues and require quick detection and alternation of paths to minimize network disruption.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of locally generated random nonces and attestation tokens within a network service mesh (NSM) to verify the integrity of pods and network service endpoints (NSE pods) using a certificate authority server, ensuring secure and integrity-verified paths by instantiating and periodically re-validating connections.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If integrity verification is implemented using locally generated random nonces and attestation tokens, then security and reliability are improved, but device complexity and processing overhead increase
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary integrity verification by generating random nonces and attestation tokens before establishing network paths. This advance verification ensures that only integrity-validated entities can communicate, preventing compromised entities from establishing malicious paths in the first place
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces intermediary components including the certificate authority server that issues digital certificates, and the integrity verification mechanism that acts as a mediator between communicating entities. These intermediaries validate identities and establish trust without requiring direct verification between all entity pairs
2Reliability
If continuous integrity verification and rapid path alternation are implemented, then network security is improved, but network disruption and service continuity are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The system pre-establishes multiple integrity-verified paths before they are needed. When the primary path is compromised, the system can immediately switch to a pre-validated alternate path without performing new integrity checks, thus minimizing network disruption time while maintaining security
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements redundancy by maintaining multiple backup paths that have already undergone integrity verification. This cushioning mechanism ensures that if the primary path fails or is compromised, there are pre-prepared alternate routes ready for immediate use, reducing the impact of network disruptions
3Measurement precision
If multiple integrity verification steps including CA server validation are performed, then measurement precision of entity integrity is improved, but processing time and productivity are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
Integrity verification including CA server validation is performed in advance before network paths are established. The digital certificates and attestation tokens are obtained beforehand, so when communication is needed, the verification process is already complete or can be quickly validated without delays
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses digital certificates and attestation tokens as copies of identity and integrity information. Instead of repeatedly verifying the actual identity of entities through multiple complex checks, the system validates these cryptographic copies which provide the same assurance with much faster processing
Data Source
AI summary
Techniques and mechanisms for providing integrity verified paths using only integrity validated pods of nodes. A network service mesh (NSM) associated with a first pod may locally generate a nonce and provide the nonce to the first pod, where the request includes a request for an attestation token. Using the nonce, the first pod may generate the attestation token and reply back to the NSM. The NSM may generate a second request for an attestation token and forward it to a NSE pod, where the request includes a second locally generated nonce generated by the NSM. The NSE pod may generate the second attestation token using the second nonce and reply back to the NSM. The NSM may then have the attestation tokens verified or validated by a certificate authority (CA) server. The NSM may thus instantiate an integrity verified path between the first pod and the NSE pod.