Kernel Intrusion Blocking via Privilege Inversion Monitoring
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for monitoring malicious programs lack reliability in detecting kernel-space access and fail to effectively block unauthorized access, as they are limited by the privilege level of the monitoring modules and require external devices or user-configured settings.
Innovation Solution
A monitoring system that loads monitoring software with a higher privilege level than the OS kernel, allowing it to hook and evaluate kernel instructions, detect malicious access, and block unauthorized access by setting a hook condition and correcting it.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If monitoring software is configured at the same privilege level as the OS kernel, then the monitoring module can access kernel resources, but the monitoring reliability is compromised and malicious programs can bypass detection
Solution Approach 1:
The patent inverts the traditional privilege level arrangement by positioning the monitoring software (hypervisor) at a higher privilege level (ring -1) than the OS kernel (ring 0). This inversion allows the monitoring software to supervise kernel operations without being compromised by kernel-level malicious programs, fundamentally resolving the reliability issue while maintaining manageable system complexity through structured privilege separation.
2Reliability
If monitoring software hooks kernel instructions to detect malicious access, then unauthorized access can be detected, but system performance deteriorates due to continuous monitoring overhead
Solution Approach 1:
The monitoring software implements partial monitoring by selectively hooking only specific kernel instructions that are critical for security (e.g., system call interfaces, memory access instructions) rather than monitoring all kernel operations. This approach maintains high detection accuracy for malicious activities while minimizing performance overhead by avoiding unnecessary monitoring of benign operations.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary layer (the hypervisor/monitoring software) between the user space applications and the kernel. This intermediary intercepts and evaluates kernel instructions indirectly through controlled interfaces, reducing the direct monitoring overhead on the kernel while maintaining detection capability. The intermediary acts as a buffer that filters and evaluates only relevant operations.
3Reliability
If the monitoring software is loaded after the OS kernel, then the kernel can be initialized first, but the monitoring software cannot establish higher privilege level control
Solution Approach 1:
The monitoring software (hypervisor) is loaded and initialized before the OS kernel during the boot process. This preliminary action establishes the hypervisor's higher privilege level (ring -1) control before the kernel is initialized, ensuring that the monitoring software can supervise kernel operations from the outset. The boot process is modified to first load the hypervisor, which then configures the privilege level structure before loading the kernel.
4Reliability
If traditional monitoring methods use hash collation to authenticate applications, then legitimate applications can be identified, but the system may stop operation when authentication fails
Solution Approach 1:
The monitoring software acts as an intermediary that evaluates kernel instructions and application behaviors without relying solely on hash collation authentication. When authentication uncertainty arises, the intermediary layer can intercept operations, log suspicious activities, and make granular decisions about individual operations rather than forcing complete system shutdown. This maintains system continuity while preserving security monitoring.
Data Source
AI summary
An information processing device (1) includes: a Syscall instruction monitoring part (313) configured to monitor at least an instruction to pass processing to a kernel (35) of an OS among instructions issued to a CPU (11); and an exclusive loader (201) configured to load a monitoring software (31) functioning as the Syscall instruction monitoring part (313) at region A in a RAM (30), the monitoring software set at ring 0 that is higher than ring (2) set for the kernel (35) of the OS. Even when an access is tried to a resource by executing a malicious program, the access can be detected and intrusion of the malicious program to the kernel can be blocked.


