Cryptographic Key Correction via Checksum Intermediary
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for correcting cryptographic keys in symmetrical cryptographic methods over error-prone channels, such as quantum communication channels, are computationally expensive and require high resource loads, and external data processing introduces security risks due to the need for secret key transmission to potentially unreliable data centers.
Innovation Solution
A method where checksums are formed and transmitted between terminals, with a server calculating a correction value from these checksums to align the keys, allowing for key correction on devices with greater computing capacity and reduced confidentiality requirements, using a publicly accessible server and non-tap-proof communication channels.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If key correction is performed locally in terminal devices using traditional error correction methods, then key alignment can be achieved, but computational resources and processing time are excessively consumed
Solution Approach 1:
A server acts as an intermediary between terminal devices to perform the computationally intensive key correction process. The server receives checksums from terminals, calculates correction values using error correction algorithms, and returns corrected keys to terminals. This transfers computational burden from resource-constrained terminals to a powerful external server, resolving the contradiction between achieving reliable key alignment and minimizing local computational resource consumption.
2Power
If external data centers are used for key correction, then computational capacity is increased, but security risks arise from transmitting secret keys to potentially unreliable third parties
Solution Approach 1:
The secret key material is extracted from the terminal devices and replaced with checksums (syndrome values) that are mathematically related to the keys but do not reveal the actual key values. These checksums are transmitted to the external server for correction processing. The server can compute correction values without ever knowing the actual secret keys, thus maintaining confidentiality while utilizing external computing power.
Solution Approach 2:
The key representation is transformed from direct key values to checksum values (syndromes) through mathematical encoding. This parameter transformation allows the external server to work with equivalent mathematical representations that preserve the error correction functionality while eliminating security risks associated with transmitting actual secret keys to third parties.
3Reliability
If traditional error correction methods are used over error-prone channels, then key distribution can be achieved, but the complexity and resource requirements of the correction process increase significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The server serves as an intermediary that centralizes the complex error correction computations. Terminal devices only need to perform simple checksum calculations and communicate with the server, rather than implementing complex error correction algorithms locally. This distribution of computational complexity resolves the contradiction between achieving reliable key distribution over error-prone channels and minimizing device complexity.
Data Source
Figure 1
AI summary
The invention relates to a method for creating and distributing cryptographic keys, in particular for securing the communication at two terminals (A, B), wherein a) signals for creating correlated values in the two terminals (A, B) are distributed via a first communication channel (Q) burdened with error, in particular via a quantum communication channel, and said correlated values are present as keys (kA, kB) in the two terminals in such a manner, b) a checksum (sA) is formed on the basis of the first key (kA) present in the first terminal (A) and said checksum (sA) is transferred to the second terminal (B) via a second communication channel (L) different from the first communication channel (Q), c) a second checksum (sB) is formed on the basis of the second key (kB) present in the second terminal (B), and the two checksums (sA, sB) or the difference (serr) of the two checksums (sA, sB) or information derived therefrom is transferred via the second communication channel (L) to a server (C), which is different from the two terminals (A, B) and is spatially separated therefrom, d) on the basis of the two checksums (sA, sB) or the difference (serr) of the two checksums (sA, sB) or the information derived therefrom, the server (C) determines a correction value (kerr), which, when applied to one or both keys (kA, kB), brings the keys (kA, kB) into correspondence, and e) the correction value (kerr) is transferred to one or both terminals (A, B) via the second communication channel (L) and is applied to one or both keys (kA, kB).