Key Distribution System for Identity Anonymity in Internet of Vehicles
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Solution Overview
Problem
In the LTE-V-based Internet of Vehicles architecture, the temporary ID management function is not a trusted agency, leading to insecurity in the distribution of SSK and PVT, as it can trace user identities, compromising the security of the message authentication process.
Innovation Solution
A key distribution system is implemented involving user equipment (UE), a mobile operator network element (MNO), and a Key Management System (KMS), where the UE establishes a security connection with the MNO, and the KMS allocates identity-based cryptography (IBC) PVT and SSK without learning the UE's identity, ensuring the MNO and KMS cannot trace the real identity of the UE based on the signature generated.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the temporary ID management function distributes SSK and PVT to UE, then the message authentication process can be implemented, but the user identity can be traced by the temporary ID management function, compromising security
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a key distribution function as an intermediary component between the temporary ID management function and the UE. This key distribution function receives key requests from the temporary ID management function, generates SSK and PVT pairs, and distributes them to the UE without the temporary ID management function being able to trace user identities. The intermediary architecture isolates the identity tracing capability from the key distribution process, thereby resolving the security contradiction.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent segments the key distribution process into separate functional modules: the temporary ID management function handles identity management, the key distribution function handles key generation and distribution, and the UE handles local key storage and message signing. This segmentation ensures that no single function can trace user identities while maintaining secure message authentication, as each function operates with limited scope and authority.
2Productivity
If the KMS generates and sends SSK and PVT to the temporary ID management function, then the key distribution process can be completed, but the temporary ID management function can obtain UE identity based on PVT, enabling user tracking
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the identity information handling from the key distribution process. The key distribution function generates SSK and PVT pairs and sends them to the temporary ID management function, but the temporary ID management function does not receive or process UE identity information in relation to these keys. The identity information is extracted from the key distribution flow, preventing the temporary ID management function from linking PVT to UE identity, thus maintaining user anonymity while preserving key distribution efficiency.
3Ease of operation
If the UE sends key request with UE identity to the temporary ID management function, then the authentication process can proceed, but the temporary ID management function can associate PVT with UE identity, enabling user tracing
Solution Approach 1:
The key distribution function serves as an intermediary that receives key requests from the temporary ID management function and processes them without exposing UE identity information. This intermediary layer maintains the authentication process flow while preventing the temporary ID management function from accessing UE identity data, thus resolving the contradiction between ease of operation and identity tracing prevention.
Solution Approach 2:
The authentication process is segmented into distinct phases: identity authentication phase (handled by temporary ID management function), key generation phase (handled by key distribution function), and key distribution phase (handled by key distribution function and UE). This segmentation ensures that UE identity is only associated with authentication results, not with PVT or SSK, preventing identity tracing while maintaining smooth authentication flow.
Data Source
AI summary
A key distribution method is disclosed. In this method, a key request can be received by a key management system (KMS) from a mobile operator network element (MNO). The key request can carry a public key of UE. At least one PVT and one SSK can be allocated to the US based on an IBC ID. The at least one PVT and SSK can be encrypted based on the public key to generate ciphertext; and an object can be signed based on a preset digital signature private key (DSPK) to generate a digital signature. The object can include the public key and the ciphertext. Still, a signature validation public key associated with the DSPK can be determined and a key response can be returned to the MNO. The key response can carry the signature validation public key, the public key of the UE, the ciphertext, and the digital signature.