Key Synchronization for Network Disaster Recovery
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Solution Overview
Problem
In web services with multiple sites, maintaining synchronization of message authentication keys between primary and backup locations is challenging, especially when keys are periodically rolled over to enhance security, leading to invalidation of existing messages and potential hacking risks.
Innovation Solution
A data repository is introduced to manage key generation and message authentication codes, where public servers access only message authentication codes (MAC), key identifiers, and expiration times, with active and inactive key tables ensuring seamless authentication and rollover processes across sites.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Device complexity
If keys are maintained on the primary site only, then key management is simplified, but the backup site cannot authenticate messages after failover
Solution Approach 1:
The patent pre-generates and stores multiple key sets (including future keys) on the backup site before failover occurs. This preliminary action ensures that when the primary site fails, the backup site immediately has the necessary keys to authenticate messages without interruption, resolving the contradiction between simplified key management and authentication continuity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent creates copies of key sets from the primary site and stores them on the backup site. Instead of maintaining a single master key on the primary site, multiple key copies are distributed to the backup site in advance, enabling the backup to independently authenticate messages after failover while maintaining security through key rotation capabilities.
2Reliability
If keys are rolled over periodically, then security is enhanced, but existing messages become invalid and synchronization becomes complex
Solution Approach 1:
The system pre-generates multiple key sets in advance and stores them on both primary and backup sites. When rollover is needed, the system switches to a pre-generated key set without complex real-time synchronization, as all necessary keys are already distributed. This maintains security through frequent effective key changes while avoiding synchronization complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements dynamic key management where key sets are periodically rotated and new key sets are generated and distributed in advance. The system can dynamically switch between key sets based on timing or security requirements, allowing frequent key changes for security while maintaining simplicity through pre-distribution of multiple key versions.
3Productivity
If multiple servers in the farm have keys, then authentication can be distributed, but key synchronization between servers becomes difficult
Solution Approach 1:
The patent distributes copies of key sets to multiple servers in the farm and to the backup site. Each server receives identical key copies, enabling any server to handle authentication requests. This copying approach allows authentication distribution across multiple servers without requiring complex real-time synchronization, as all servers have the same key sets available locally.
4Object-affected harmful factors
If keys are valid for a short period, then hacking resistance is improved, but key update frequency must increase
Solution Approach 1:
The system pre-generates multiple key sets with short validity periods and stores them in advance on all servers and backup sites. This allows the system to frequently rotate to new keys for hacking resistance while avoiding the complexity of real-time key generation and distribution. The preliminary preparation of multiple short-lived keys enables frequent effective key changes without increasing operational complexity.
Data Source
AI summary
A method and apparatus for managing and backing-up a set of security keys are disclosed. The keys are generated first at a backup site and then are transmitted from the backup site to the primary site. The primary site then uses these keys to generate message authentication code for messages generated at the primary site. A portion of the key information is transmitted to a client site in the message. The client site then provides the message authentication code back to the service in a subsequent request. The message authentication code generated at the primary site is readable by the backup site. The primary site then takes the portion of the key information and uses this to verify the received message authentication code. In alternative embodiments the actual values used for generating the message authentication code are not transmitted in the message nor are the exposed to the public side of the service.