Keyless Encryption Magic Value Generation Without Memory Storage
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing cryptographic systems are vulnerable to hacking as plaintext keys stored in volatile memory can be accessed by malicious users, despite obfuscation techniques that do not completely eliminate the risk of key retrieval.
Innovation Solution
A keyless encryption and decryption system that generates a 'magic value' at runtime using a combination of hardware and software configurations, such as CPU Identifier and process ID, to perform cryptographic operations without storing the magic value in memory.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If cryptographic material is stored in volatile memory for use, then cryptographic operations can be performed, but the system becomes vulnerable to hacking as plaintext keys can be accessed by malicious users
Solution Approach 1:
The invention extracts the cryptographic material from volatile memory by using public key infrastructure to decrypt data only when needed for cryptographic operations. The private key never resides in volatile memory in plaintext form,而是 stored securely in non-volatile memory and only used through cryptographic protocols that prevent memory extraction attacks.
Solution Approach 2:
The invention introduces public key cryptography as an intermediary mechanism. Instead of directly storing and using private keys in volatile memory, the system uses public keys for encryption and mathematical protocols for decryption, with the private key remaining protected in non-volatile storage. This intermediary layer prevents direct access to plaintext cryptographic material in memory.
2Object-affected harmful factors
If obfuscation techniques are used to store cryptographic material in memory, then the likelihood of key recovery is reduced, but reverse engineering can still allow attackers to retrieve the pattern required to decrypt data
Solution Approach 1:
The invention removes cryptographic material entirely from volatile memory through obfuscation. Instead of storing keys in plaintext or simple obfuscated forms in RAM, the system extracts them to secure non-volatile storage and uses public key infrastructure to access them only when needed, eliminating the memory storage vulnerability entirely.
Solution Approach 2:
The invention inverts the traditional approach by not storing cryptographic material in volatile memory at all. Instead of trying to protect stored keys through obfuscation, the system protects them by never storing them in the vulnerable medium (volatile memory), using non-volatile secure storage and on-demand cryptographic access instead.
Data Source
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AI summary
A system (200) and method (400) for keyless cryptographic operations can include one or more processors (204) and memory (202) operatively coupled to the one or more processors, where the memory includes computer instructions causing the one or more processors to perform certain operations. The operations can include generating (402) a magic value at runtime of the one or more processors to perform a cryptographic operation by creating (404) a random index for a first array (302) from a second array (304), wherein the second array comprises a pre-defined index of methods (306b, 308b, etc) computing static fields of the system, algorithmically deriving (406) the magic value from the second array on the basis of values in the first array, and using (408) the magic value for the cryptographic operation without ever storing the magic value or a portion thereof in memory.