KSE Enclave Key Generation for Edge Cloud Security
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current cryptographic key exchange methods for securing connections between edge devices and cloud datacenters are vulnerable due to the exposure of secret private session keys and certificates on software servers, which are susceptible to cyber-attacks, especially when Root Certificate Authorities delegate their authority to secondary CA entities connected to the internet.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a Keys Security Entity (KSE) enclave to generate master keys and one-time connection session keys, which are then securely output to a Connection Security Entity (CSE) enclave over an encrypted link, while preventing access to the master keys and periodically verifying the state of the CSE enclave to prevent compromised sessions.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If cryptographic key exchange algorithms are implemented on software servers for session authentication and encryption, then the system can handle huge scale of millions of simultaneous connections, but the secret private session keys and certificates become exposed to theft by hackers
Solution Approach 1:
The system separates key generation and storage functions into a dedicated Hardware Security Module (HSM) that is physically isolated from the software servers handling connections. The HSM generates and stores private keys in a secure environment, while software servers only receive public keys and encrypted data for processing. This segmentation allows high-scale connection handling on software servers while maintaining key security in hardware.
Solution Approach 2:
The HSM acts as an intermediary between the trusted Root CA and the software servers. It receives requests from software servers for cryptographic operations, performs them in a secure environment, and returns results without exposing private keys. This intermediary role enables software servers to provide high-scale service while the HSM protects the security-critical functions.
2Adaptability or versatility
If Root Certificate Authority delegates authority to secondary CA entities connected to the internet, then the system can provide widespread certificate distribution, but the delegated entities become vulnerable to cyber-attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The critical security function of private key storage and protection is extracted from the internet-connected secondary CA entities and placed in air-gapped HSMs. The HSMs are physically isolated from network connections, eliminating cyber-attack vectors while still enabling certificate distribution through secure cryptographic operations. Software servers handle the distributed certificate management while HSMs protect the root secrets.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses short-lived session keys and certificates that are generated, used, and discarded rapidly. Each connection session receives unique cryptographic credentials that expire immediately after use. This approach limits the window of opportunity for attackers even if they compromise a secondary CA entity, as the compromised credentials are already obsolete.
3Ease of operation
If secret private session keys are kept in software on servers, then the system can provide easy access for authentication, but the keys become open to theft enabling hackers to control private secret data exchange
Solution Approach 1:
The system replaces software-based key storage with hardware-based security modules. The HSM provides a physically secured environment for key storage that cannot be accessed or modified by software attacks. Authentication operations are performed through secure hardware interfaces that prevent unauthorized key extraction while maintaining ease of use for legitimate authentication purposes.
Data Source
AI summary
At least one non-transitory computer readable medium, that at least one non-transitory computer readable medium stores instructions for (a) generating master keys by a keys security entity (KSE) that is established within a KSE; (b) generating one-time connection session keys, by the KSE, based on the master keys; (c) outputting, by the KSE, the one-time connection session keys to a Connection Security Entity (CSE) enclave in which a CSE is established, over a secure communication link; and (d) preventing access, by the KSE, to the master keys.


