Laser Probing for Hardware Trojan Detection in ICs
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for detecting hardware Trojans in integrated circuits are either destructive or inaccurate, failing to provide a non-destructive and reliable means to identify malicious circuitry introduced during fabrication at untrusted foundries.
Innovation Solution
A non-destructive laser probing technique that generates an electro-optical frequency map (EOFM) of an integrated circuit's active layer, comparing it to a reference map to detect hardware Trojans by identifying intensity mismatches, using image processing techniques to mitigate noise and differentiate between benign and malicious components.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If destructive reverse engineering or complex test processes are used to detect hardware Trojans, then detection capability is improved, but the IC becomes unusable or the process becomes overly complex
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces destructive physical analysis methods with non-destructive optical probing. Laser beams probe the IC circuitry to generate electro-optical frequency maps, allowing Trojan detection without physical damage or complex destructive testing procedures, thus maintaining IC usability.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces electro-optical frequency maps as an intermediary representation of IC behavior. These maps serve as a mediator between the IC and detection analysis, enabling Trojan identification through comparison with golden models without direct manipulation or damage to the IC itself.
2Ease of operation
If existing non-destructive detection methods are used, then IC usability is maintained, but detection accuracy is insufficient
Solution Approach 1:
The patent performs preliminary characterization of the IC by generating electro-optical frequency maps at multiple frequencies before Trojan detection. This preliminary action creates a comprehensive behavioral profile that enhances subsequent detection accuracy by providing baseline data for comparison with potential Trojan-containing states.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies periodic probing signals at multiple frequencies to the IC and measures the resulting electro-optical responses. This periodic action at varying frequencies enables precise characterization of circuit behavior and improves Trojan detection accuracy by identifying frequency-specific anomalies.
3Reliability
If multiple frequency measurements are taken to improve detection accuracy, then Trojan detection capability is improved, but measurement time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent measures electro-optical frequency maps at multiple frequencies, which is more than a single frequency measurement would provide. This excessive action in terms of measurement points enhances detection accuracy by capturing broader behavioral characteristics, with the trade-off of increased measurement time being acceptable for critical security applications.
Applied Scientific Principles
This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.
Function Achieved in This Case
Enables the detection of hardware Trojans without rendering the IC unusable, providing a reliable and accurate method to identify sequential and combinational Trojans through electro-optical frequency mapping and image processing, enhancing the security of semiconductor integrated circuits.
Implementation Method 1
The variations in current density in the active layer modulate the laser signal as the index of reflection changes with the current flow.
Data Source
AI summary
A method includes in part, generating an electro-optical frequency map (EOFM) of an active layer of an integrated circuit (IC), retrieving a reference map of the IC, comparing the EOFM of the IC with the reference map to determine whether there is a match between an intensity of an identified region in the EOFM map and an intensity of a corresponding region of the reference map, and detecting one or more hardware trojans in the IC if there is no match. The reference map may be associated with a layout of an IC known not to include hardware trojans. The reference map also may be a second EOFM associated with the IC. Alternatively, the reference map may be generated by applying power to the IC, and applying a clock signal to the IC.