Lattice-Based Cryptography for Quantum-Resistant Multi-Party Computation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current multi-party electronic computation methods are vulnerable to attacks by quantum computers due to their reliance on factoring and discrete logarithm-based cryptographic primitives, which are not secure against quantum computer threats.
Innovation Solution
Implementing lattice-based cryptography to secure multi-party electronic computation, using lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs and homomorphic commitments to ensure input privacy and correctness, while resisting quantum computer attacks by utilizing multiple evaluating computer systems.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If factoring or discrete logarithm-based cryptographic primitives are used for multi-party electronic computation, then the computation can be performed using established cryptographic methods, but the security is compromised against quantum computer attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent changes the fundamental cryptographic parameter from factoring/discrete logarithm hardness to lattice-based hardness assumptions. This parameter change enables security against quantum attacks while maintaining the functionality of multi-party electronic computation. The lattice-based cryptographic primitives provide the same cryptographic security guarantees but with quantum resistance as the underlying mathematical assumption.
2Reliability
If lattice-based cryptography is implemented for quantum-resistant security, then security against quantum attacks is achieved, but the computational complexity and implementation difficulty increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the multi-party computation protocol into distinct phases: input sharing phase, computation phase, and output phase. Each phase uses lattice-based cryptographic primitives in a structured manner, breaking down the complex implementation into manageable components. The lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs and homomorphic commitments are applied systematically across multiple evaluating computer systems, reducing overall implementation complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs as an intermediary mechanism to verify commitments without revealing underlying data. This intermediary proof system enables secure verification in the multi-party computation while maintaining quantum resistance, bridging the gap between security requirements and implementation feasibility.
3Reliability
If multiple evaluating computer systems are used to maintain security against collusion, then the security is improved, but the system complexity and communication overhead increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides the computation task across multiple evaluating computer systems, with each system receiving and processing only a portion of the encrypted input data. This segmentation ensures that no single system has access to the complete information, providing security against collusion. The lattice-based homomorphic encryption enables each system to perform computations on its portion independently while maintaining overall security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent combines the results from multiple evaluating computer systems through homomorphic operations on encrypted data. The individual computation results are merged in encrypted form, and only the final decrypted result reveals the computation outcome. This merging approach maintains security while achieving the computational goal across distributed systems.
Data Source
AI summary
The invention relates to a method for performing a multi-party electronic computation using a plurality of evaluating computer systems. The cryptographic security of the multi-party computation is implemented using lattice-based cryptography. Each evaluating computer system receives from each user of a plurality of users an individual input share of an input chosen by the respective user. Furthermore, each evaluating computer system receives from the user a commitment to the received individual input share and an opening information. Each evaluating computer system checks the commitments received to the individual input shares and generates a first lattice-based zero-knowledge proof that all the commitments received are valid commitments to input shares. Each evaluating computer system publishes the first lattice-based zero-knowledge proof. Thus, a verifier may be enabled to verify that all commitments are valid commitments to input shares.