Layered SSL/TLS Tunneling for Firewall Bypass and Authentication

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing network communication technologies face challenges in establishing secure tunnels through firewalls, particularly in scenarios where inbound connections are restricted, and there is a lack of end-to-end security and integrity, making systems vulnerable to attacks from unauthenticated clients and compromised middle servers.

Innovation Solution

A three-component secure tunnel system is implemented, using a client, an outer agent, and an inner agent, where the outer agent acts as a relay to establish SSL/TLS sessions on standard ports, bypassing packet filtering and application-level firewalls, and ensuring end-to-end security through layered SSL/TLS connections, with authentication mechanisms to verify client certificates and prevent unauthorized access.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If SSL/TLS connections are used to provide secure communication, then security and privacy are improved, but the requirement for direct connection means firewalls must open holes allowing unauthorized access

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidfirewall vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces an outer agent as an intermediary component that relays connections between clients and inner agents. The outer agent receives connections on standard ports (allowing firewall passage) and forwards them to inner agents, eliminating the need for firewalls to open direct holes for SSL/TLS connections while maintaining security through the layered architecture

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Ease of operation

If middle servers are used to relay connections through firewalls, then firewall restrictions are bypassed, but end-to-end security and integrity are lost making the system vulnerable to compromised servers

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvefirewall bypass capabilityVSAvoidend-to-end security
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the connection into multiple independent SSL/TLS layers: an outer SSL/TLS layer between client and outer agent, and an inner SSL/TLS layer between client and inner agent. This segmentation ensures that even if the outer agent is compromised, the inner SSL/TLS layer maintains end-to-end security and integrity between the client and inner agent

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements nested SSL/TLS sessions where the inner SSL/TLS session is encapsulated within the outer SSL/TLS session. The inner agent and client establish their own authenticated connection that is nested inside the outer connection, providing security within security and maintaining end-to-end protection even through a compromised middle relay

Inventive Principle:
Principle #7Nested doll (Nesting)

3Reliability

If authentication mechanisms are implemented to verify clients, then unauthorized access is prevented, but the complexity of the connection establishment process increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveaccess controlVSAvoidconnection establishment complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent performs authentication in advance during the SSL/TLS handshake phase before any data transmission occurs. By verifying client certificates during the initial connection establishment, the system ensures only authenticated clients can proceed, preventing unauthorized access while managing complexity through standardized cryptographic protocols

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

4Ease of operation

If two connections are used for each tunneled connection as in HTTP tunneling, then firewall passage is achieved, but the security of SSL connections is lost

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvefirewall compatibilityVSAvoidSSL security
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent merges the benefits of HTTP tunneling (firewall compatibility through standard ports) with SSL security by establishing SSL/TLS sessions on both the outer and inner connections. Instead of using unsecured HTTP tunneling, the system combines multiple SSL-secured connections to achieve both firewall compatibility and maintained security

Inventive Principle:
Principle #5Merging (Combining)

Data Source

PatentUS7661131B1Authentication of tunneled connections
Publication Date: 2010.02.09 ORACLE AMERICAN INC
  • US7661131B1 patent drawing
  • US7661131B1 patent drawing
  • US7661131B1 patent drawing

AI summary

Systems and methods are described for authentication of tunneled connections. A method includes establishing a first connection (CIO) from an inner agent to an outer agent including making a first TCP connection from the inner agent to the outer agent, negotiating a first SSL/TLS session (SSLSessionIO) between the inner agent and the outer agent over the first TCP connection and applying the second SSL/TLS session (SSLSessionIO) between the inner agent and the outer agent over the first TCP connection; establishing a second connection (CCO) from a client and the outer agent including making a second TCP connection from the client to the outer agent, negotiating a second SSL/TLS session (SSLSessionCO) between the client and the outer agent over the second TCP connection and applying the second SSL/TLS session (SSLSessionCO) between the client and the outer agent over the second TCP connection; and then negotiating a third SSL/TLS session (SSLSessionCI) between the client and the inner agent via both the first SSL/TLS session (SSLSessionIO) and the second SSL/TLS session (SSLSessionCO) and applying the third SSL/TLS session (SSLSessionCI) between the client and the inner agent layered over both the first SSL/TLS session (SSLSessionIO) and the second SSL/TLS session (SSLSessionCO), wherein negotiating the second SSL/TLS session (SSLSessionCO) includes verifying at the outer agent that the client possesses a certificate signed with a certificate associated with the inner agent.