Least-Privilege Security Architecture for Process Control Software
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Solution Overview
Problem
Process control systems face significant security challenges, particularly from zero-day malware attacks, as existing security features like anti-virus software and white listing are insufficient, and the complexity of network growth makes it impractical to monitor and control access to all ports, leading to potential harmful network traffic and malware propagation.
Innovation Solution
Implement a software security architecture based on 'least privileges' that isolates services and desktop applications using namespace partitioning and strict access controls, limiting privileges to a specified subset, and enforcing communication through trusted interprocess channels to prevent malware from escalating privileges and spreading.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional security features like anti-virus software and white listing are used, then some level of security is provided, but they are insufficient against zero-day malware attacks and do not prevent privilege escalation
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the process control device into multiple namespaces (service namespace and logged-on user namespaces) that isolate services from desktop applications. This segmentation prevents malware in one namespace from affecting services in another namespace, providing security against zero-day attacks without requiring complex security software.
Solution Approach 2:
The system applies different privilege levels to different namespaces: services run with elevated privileges in the service namespace while desktop applications run with standard user privileges in logged-on user namespaces. This local quality differentiation ensures that even if malware infects a desktop application, it cannot escalate to service-level privileges.
2Adaptability or versatility
If network access and port connectivity are expanded to enable device functionality, then system versatility is improved, but monitoring and controlling access to all ports becomes impractical, leading to security vulnerabilities
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments network access control by namespace, where the service namespace handles all network communications and the desktop application namespace has restricted network access. This segmentation allows comprehensive network functionality while simplifying security control to namespace-level permissions rather than individual port monitoring.
3Adaptability or versatility
If services are granted elevated privileges to perform control functions, then system functionality is improved, but malware can exploit these privileges to cause harm and propagate
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments privilege access by creating separate namespaces where services operate with elevated privileges isolated from desktop applications. Malware running in the desktop application namespace cannot access or exploit service privileges due to namespace boundaries, eliminating the privilege escalation vulnerability while maintaining full service functionality.
Solution Approach 2:
The service namespace acts as an intermediary that mediates between desktop applications and privileged system resources. Desktop applications communicate with services through controlled interfaces, preventing malware from directly accessing elevated privileges while allowing legitimate service functionality.
Data Source
AI summary
A process control system software security architecture, that is more effective at preventing zero-day or other types of malware attacks, implements the use of “least privileges” when executing the applications and services run within a computer device. The least privileges based architecture separates “service” processes from desktop applications that run on behalf of a logged-on user by partitioning the global namespace of the software system into service namespaces and logged-on user namespaces, and by strictly controlling communications between the applications and services in these different namespaces using interprocess communications. Moreover, the security architecture uses custom accounts to assure that each service process has the least set of privileges that are needed for implementing its function regardless of the privileges associated with the calling application or user.