Locomotive Functional Safety System Command Validation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Non-remote control locomotive (RCL) operations in the freight rail industry lack the safety and productivity enhancements associated with RCL systems, as they do not have universal adoption and thus miss out on safety features like automatic braking and speed control.

Innovation Solution

A locomotive functional safety system that intercepts and interprets manual commands from the locomotive engineer, applying safety rules to ensure only compliant commands are relayed to the train systems, including throttle, brake, and pneumatic controls, and provides features like Pullback and Stopping Protection and speed limiting, enhancing safety and productivity without full remote control adoption.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If manual control operations are used without safety systems, then operational simplicity is maintained, but safety and productivity are reduced

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveoperational safetyVSAvoidcontrol system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

A functional safety system is introduced as an intermediary between the manual control stand and the train systems. This safety system intercepts, interprets, and approves or disapproves manual commands before they are relayed to throttle, brake, and pneumatic controls, thereby enhancing safety without requiring complete remote control adoption

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The control system is segmented into distinct functional components: a manual control stand for operator input, a functional safety system for command interception and validation, and train systems for execution. This segmentation allows the safety system to operate independently as a safety layer without replacing the entire control architecture

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

2Reliability

If remote control operation is fully adopted, then safety and productivity are improved, but implementation complexity and cost increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveoperational safetyVSAvoidsystem implementation complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

Instead of implementing full remote control operation, the patent applies partial action by implementing only the essential safety functions (command interception, interpretation, and validation) needed to improve safety. This partial implementation achieves safety enhancements without the full complexity and cost of complete remote control adoption

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

3Reliability

If safety rules are applied to manual commands, then operational safety is improved, but command processing time increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecommand safety validationVSAvoidcommand processing time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The functional safety system performs preliminary action by pre-defining safety rules and validation criteria before operations occur. The system is configured with firmware functions that regulate safety, allowing rapid validation of commands against predetermined safety parameters without time-consuming real-time analysis

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS11993297B2Increasing functional safety of locomotives
Publication Date: 2024.05.28 CATTRON NORTH AMERICA INC
  • US11993297B2 patent drawing
  • US11993297B2 patent drawing
  • US11993297B2 patent drawing

AI summary

The present disclosure generally relates to systems and methods of increasing functional safety of locomotives. In exemplary embodiments, a locomotive functional safety system is configured to: receive one or more manual control commands from a locomotive control stand and/or a user interface onboard a locomotive; determine whether the one or more manual control commands pass or satisfy one or more predetermined criteria; if the one or more manual control commands pass or satisfy the one or more predetermined criteria, approve the one or more manual control commands and allow the one or more manual control commands to be relayed onward and/or acted upon; and if the one or more manual control commands do not pass or satisfy the one or more predetermined criteria, disapprove the one or more manual control commands and disallow the one or more manual control commands to be relayed onward and/or acted upon.