Log Data Integrity via Remote Hardware Verification
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for protecting log data integrity, such as intrusion detection systems and remote attestation services, are inadequate in preventing attackers with administrator privileges or kernel control from manipulating log data, which can conceal malicious activities.
Innovation Solution
A method utilizing a second logic circuit with dedicated hardware, such as a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), to encrypt and protect log data elements with secret information unknown to the primary logic circuit, generating protected log data elements that include hash values and signatures, ensuring integrity and detectability of modifications.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If log data is stored in a standard file system accessible by the operating system, then ease of operation and accessibility are improved, but security and integrity protection deteriorate because attackers with administrator privileges can manipulate or delete log data
Solution Approach 1:
The system separates log data storage into two distinct locations: a first storage location accessible by the operating system for normal operations, and a second storage location protected by a trusted platform module that stores cryptographic hash values. This segmentation allows the OS to continue accessing log data while the TPM independently verifies its integrity, resolving the contradiction between accessibility and integrity protection.
Solution Approach 2:
The trusted platform module acts as an intermediary between the log data and the verification process. It stores cryptographic hash values of log data in a protected second storage location and provides these hash values for verification without exposing the raw log data to potential manipulation. This intermediary mechanism enables integrity verification while maintaining normal log data accessibility.
2Adaptability or versatility
If administrators are given full access to log data for monitoring purposes, then monitoring capability is improved, but security deteriorates because attackers can exploit administrator privileges to compromise log integrity
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary cryptographic hashing of log data before it can be accessed or modified. The trusted platform module stores these pre-computed hash values in a protected second storage location, establishing an integrity baseline before any potential manipulation occurs. This preliminary action enables later verification without limiting normal monitoring access.
Solution Approach 2:
The system transforms log data into a different form (cryptographic hash values) for storage in the protected second location. This transformation changes the 'color' or representation of the data - the original log data remains accessible for monitoring, while the transformed hash values provide tamper-evident verification, allowing both monitoring capability and security to coexist.
3Reliability
If log data is protected using traditional file integrity monitoring, then some protection is provided, but protection fails when attackers have administrator rights or kernel control
Solution Approach 1:
The system adds a new dimension of protection by introducing a trusted platform module that operates independently from the operating system's file system. Instead of relying solely on OS-level file integrity monitoring, the TPM creates a separate verification layer that uses cryptographic hash values stored in protected memory, providing protection that is immune to OS-level attacks and administrator privileges.
Solution Approach 2:
The system replaces traditional mechanical file integrity monitoring (which relies on OS permissions and file system checks) with a cryptographic verification mechanism. The trusted platform module uses cryptographic hash functions and secure memory protection to verify log integrity, substituting the vulnerable mechanical monitoring system with a mathematically secure verification process that cannot be compromised by administrator rights or kernel control.
Data Source
AI summary
A method for protecting the integrity of log data. The log data includes a sequence of log data elements associated with an operation of a first logic circuit. The method includes receiving, at a second logic circuit remote from the first logic circuit, a log data element of the sequence of log data elements. Based on the log data element and secret information unknown to the first logic circuit, a protected log data element is generated at the second logic circuit is provided.