Logic Circuit Locking with Self-Destruct Antifuse Mechanism

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing logic locking techniques for IC designs are vulnerable to brute force attacks, requiring a large number of locks that increase design complexity and cost.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a self-destruct circuit with a limited number of antifuse circuits that blow with each incorrect key attempt, ultimately disabling the IC if the threshold is reached.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If a large number of locks are inserted to prevent brute force attacks, then security is improved, but design complexity and cost increase

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoiddesign complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent uses antifuse circuits that can be permanently damaged after a limited number of incorrect key attempts. These disposable security elements sacrifice themselves to protect the main IC functionality, eliminating the need for complex multi-lock systems. Each antifuse acts as a single-use security barrier that destroys itself after failing to protect against brute force attacks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #27Cheap short-living objects (Disposable)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent converts the harmful effect of incorrect key attempts into a beneficial self-destruct mechanism. Instead of allowing repeated failed attempts to exhaust a large number of locks, the system uses the failed attempts to trigger antifuse circuits that permanently disable the IC after a predetermined threshold, turning the attack vector into a protective feature.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

2Reliability

If multiple antifuse circuits are used to limit incorrect attempts, then security is improved, but the IC becomes disabled after threshold is reached

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidIC functionality
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

The patent converts the harmful effect of repeated incorrect key attempts into a beneficial self-destruct mechanism. Instead of allowing repeated failed attempts to exhaust a large number of locks, the system uses the failed attempts to trigger antifuse circuits that permanently disable the IC after a predetermined threshold, turning the attack vector into a protective feature.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent applies preliminary anti-action by pre-configuring antifuse circuits that will destroy themselves after a predetermined number of incorrect attempts. This preventive measure stops brute force attacks before they can succeed, eliminating the need for complex ongoing authentication mechanisms and ensuring that the IC cannot be forced open through repeated failures.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #9Preliminary anti-action

Applied Scientific Principles

This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.

Function Achieved in This Case

This approach significantly reduces the number of keys needed for locking, simplifies the design, and prevents IC functionality even with the correct key if the antifuse threshold is exceeded, thus enhancing security against brute force attacks.

Implementation Method 1

one or more antifuse circuit connected to the switch matrix

Methodology Applied
Scientific EffectAntifuse: Antifuse

Data Source

PatentUS12333229B2Logic circuit locking with self-destruct
Publication Date: 2025.06.17 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINE CORPORATION
  • US12333229B2 patent drawing
  • US12333229B2 patent drawing
  • US12333229B2 patent drawing

AI summary

An approach for validating a logic key in an IC (integrated circuit) is disclosed. One approach includes an IC comprising of key input circuit couple to a fuse check circuit; charge pump circuit coupled to the fuse check circuit and a switch matrix; and one or more antifuse circuit connected to the switch matrix. Another approach comprises of a method including, inputting a secret key by a user; determining status of one or more antifuse circuit; validating the secret key; in responsive to the secret key not matching an original secret key, determining whether antifuse threshold has been reached; in responsive to determining that the antifuse threshold has been reached, disabling the IC; in responsive to the secret key matching the original secret key, enabling the IC; and in responsive to determining that the antifuse threshold has not been reached, activating the antifuse circuit.