Malware Detection via Naked HTTP and DNS TTL Analysis

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing security solutions are vulnerable to malware agents that frequently change domain names and IP addresses, evading detection through naked HTTP requests and DNS manipulation, which complicates the identification and mitigation of botnet agents.

Innovation Solution

A detection engine that monitors network traffic for DNS and HTTP requests, flags suspicious behavior by checking the TTL of DNS requests and identifying repeated naked HTTP requests, and designates potentially malicious processes for remediation, such as quarantining or blocking.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Difficulty of detecting and measuring

If malware agents frequently change domain names and IP addresses, then detection difficulty increases, but security monitoring capability must improve to counteract this evasion tactic

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection difficultyVSAvoidsecurity monitoring capability
Core Design Contradiction:
Difficulty of detecting and measuringVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The detection engine performs preliminary actions by establishing baseline network behavior patterns before malware can evade detection. It proactively monitors DNS request intervals and HTTP request patterns, setting up detection rules in advance that can identify malicious behavior even when domain names and IP addresses change. This preliminary monitoring allows the system to detect anomalies before they can cause harm.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements feedback mechanisms by continuously analyzing network traffic patterns and adjusting detection sensitivity based on observed behavior. When the detection engine identifies suspicious patterns such as expired DNS TTLs combined with naked HTTP requests, it feeds this information back into the detection algorithm, improving its ability to recognize similar evasion tactics in real-time and adapt to changing malware strategies.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Measurement precision

If detection engine monitors all network traffic for DNS and HTTP requests, then detection accuracy improves, but system resource consumption increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection accuracyVSAvoidsystem resource consumption
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The detection engine applies local quality by focusing monitoring resources on specific critical parameters rather than uniformly analyzing all network traffic. It specifically examines DNS request time-to-live values, intervals between DNS requests, and HTTP request patterns. By concentrating detection efforts on these localized, high-value indicators of malicious behavior, the system achieves high detection accuracy while minimizing overall resource consumption.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Solution Approach 2:

The system utilizes parameter changes by monitoring specific network protocol parameters such as DNS TTL values and request timing intervals. Instead of analyzing all aspects of network traffic, it focuses on changing parameters that are characteristic of malware behavior, such as expired DNS TTLs followed by naked HTTP requests. This selective parameter monitoring improves detection accuracy while reducing the computational burden of analyzing complete network traffic streams.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Reliability

If detection engine flags and remediates suspicious processes, then security protection improves, but false positive rate may increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity protectionVSAvoidfalse positive rate
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The detection engine performs preliminary analysis by establishing multiple detection criteria that must be satisfied before flagging a process as malicious. It looks for specific sequences of events such as DNS request failures followed by naked HTTP requests to the same destination. By requiring multiple conditions to be met before remediation action, the system reduces false positives while maintaining high security protection for genuine threats.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements feedback loops where detection results are analyzed to refine detection thresholds and reduce false positives. When legitimate applications are incorrectly flagged, the feedback mechanism adjusts detection sensitivity and adds exceptions to the monitoring rules. This continuous refinement maintains high security protection while minimizing harmful false positive rates through adaptive learning from operational experience.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS9876806B2Behavioral detection of malware agents
Publication Date: 2018.01.23 MCAFEE LLC
  • US9876806B2 patent drawing
  • US9876806B2 patent drawing
  • US9876806B2 patent drawing

AI summary

In an example, a detection engine identifies potential malware objects according to behavior. In order to circumvent blacklists and fingerprint-based detection, a malware server may frequently change domain names, and change the fingerprints of distributed malware agents. A malware agent may perform only an initial DNS lookup, and thereafter communicate with the malware command-and-control server via “naked” HTTP packets using the raw IP address of the server. The detection engine identifies malware agents by this behavior. In one example, if an executable object makes repeated HTTP requests to an address after the DNS lookup “time to live” has expired, the object may be flagged as potential malware.