MANA Protocol for IKEv2 Security with Weak Secrets
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current communication security protocols, such as IKEv2, are insecure when using weak shared secrets, particularly in constrained key management environments like personal area networks, where user passwords lack sufficient unpredictability to resist dictionary attacks, leading to potential fraud in authentication and message integrity.
Innovation Solution
A manual authentication protocol (MANA) is introduced, where an authentication code is computed using a first key and a second key within the responder, transmitted via different communication channels, allowing for pre-authentication and verification, enabling secure communication even with weak shared secrets by using a proximity-based channel for the second key and an insecure channel for the first key, and employing algorithms like Reed-Solomon codes for message authentication.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If weak shared secrets (user passwords) are used in IKEv2 protocol, then ease of operation is improved, but security reliability deteriorates due to vulnerability against dictionary attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication process is segmented into two distinct phases: pre-authentication phase where the second key is transmitted via a secure proximity-based channel, and main authentication phase where the first key is transmitted via the communication channel. This segmentation allows each phase to serve its specific security function, with the pre-authentication phase establishing trust before the main authentication occurs.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements preliminary action by performing pre-authentication before the main authentication process. The second key is transmitted and verified in advance using a secure proximity-based channel, establishing a trusted relationship before the actual authentication messages are exchanged. This preliminary action ensures that even if the first key is compromised, the pre-established trust relationship prevents dictionary attacks.
2Adaptability or versatility
If standard IKEv2 protocol is used without modifications, then adaptability is improved, but security reliability deteriorates when weak shared secrets are used
Solution Approach 1:
The patent embeds the pre-authentication mechanism within the existing IKEv2 protocol structure. The pre-authentication phase is nested before the standard IKEv2 authentication process, allowing the protocol to maintain its standard functionality while adding an additional security layer. This nested structure enables the protocol to adapt to environments with weak shared secrets without requiring complete protocol redesign.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary pre-authentication phase that mediates between the standard IKEv2 protocol and the weak shared secret environment. This intermediary layer uses a secure proximity-based channel to transmit the second key, acting as a buffer that protects the main authentication process from dictionary attacks while maintaining compatibility with standard IKEv2 operations.
3Device complexity
If the second key is transmitted via an insecure channel, then device complexity is reduced, but security reliability deteriorates due to eavesdropping risk
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by differentiating the transmission channels based on the specific requirements of each key. The second key, which is used for pre-authentication and verification, is transmitted via a secure proximity-based channel that provides localized security for this critical phase. The first key is transmitted via the standard communication channel. This differentiated approach ensures that each key receives the appropriate level of security protection for its specific function.
Data Source
AI summary
A method for securing a communication between at least one initiator (I) and one responder (R) generates a first key (KEr) within the responder (R), generates a second key (K) within the responder (R), computes an authentication code (C) using the first key (KEr) and the second key within said responder (R), transmits the second key (K) and the authentication code (C) from the responder (R) to the initiator (I) using a first communication channel, transmits the first key (KEr) from the responder (R) to the initiator (I) using a second communication channel, computes a verification code (C′) using the first key (KEr) and the second key (K) within the initiator (I), and compares the verification code (C′) with the authentication code (C) within the initiator.