Master Encryption Key Splitting for Unattended Startup
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing approaches to protecting master encryption keys in distributed computing environments require administrator passwords for access, which hinders unattended startup and scalability, and lacks sufficient security when passwords are stored insecurely.
Innovation Solution
A system that splits the master encryption key into multiple shares using a polynomial secret sharing scheme, where at least a threshold number of shares must be combined to reconstruct the key, with one share stored on a remote management server and others on managed devices, allowing unattended startup without administrator password entry and maintaining high security.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If administrator password is required to access master encryption key, then security is improved, but device startup requires administrator attendance which reduces scalability and availability
Solution Approach 1:
The master encryption key is segmented into multiple key shares using polynomial secret sharing scheme. Each key share is distributed to different devices or locations, and a threshold number of shares are required to reconstruct the master key. This eliminates the need for centralized password-based access control while maintaining security, enabling unattended device startup and improving scalability.
2Ease of operation
If administrator password is stored on device in unprotected file, then unattended startup is enabled, but security of master encryption key is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
Instead of storing the complete master encryption key or unprotected password, the system segments the key into multiple protected shares. Each share is encrypted and distributed to different devices. This allows automated retrieval during unattended startup while ensuring that no single device holds the complete unencrypted key, maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
A threshold mechanism acts as an intermediary between the stored key shares and the reconstructed master key. The system requires a threshold number of valid shares to be present before the master key can be reconstructed, providing automated access control without unprotected password storage.
3Ease of operation
If master encryption key is stored in single location, then access is simplified, but security risk increases due to single point of failure
Solution Approach 1:
The master encryption key is divided into multiple key shares that are distributed to different devices or locations. This eliminates the single point of failure while maintaining operational simplicity through automated threshold-based reconstruction. The system remains secure even if some shares are compromised or lost.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes the parameter of key storage from centralized to distributed. By transforming the master key into multiple shares with specific threshold requirements, the system achieves both security through distribution and operational simplicity through automated reconstruction processes.
Data Source
AI summary
Protecting master encryption keys by splitting the master encryption key into multiple key shares using a polynomial secret sharing scheme, and storing one share in a remote management server and the other shares in managed devices located on one or more secure networks. To reconstruct the master encryption key, a managed device obtains the remote management server share and combines it with its local share. Master encryption keys may be obtained without an administrator's password, thus supporting unattended startup of appliances. The remote management server may alert a system administrator upon release of the remote management key share, or request approval prior to releasing the remote management key share.