Measurement Data Integrity via Receiver-Side Cryptographic Proof
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for ensuring data integrity during transmission are limited by the need for specialized components and point-to-point connections, which restrict flexibility and increase complexity, and do not protect against intentional data manipulation.
Innovation Solution
A method where the control device generates a cryptographically secured representation of measurement data and verifies its integrity, shifting computational tasks to the sender side, allowing the receiver to perform less intensive operations like generating a cryptographic signature or hash value.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If known checksum methods are used for integrity protection, then transmission errors can be detected, but protection against intentional data manipulation is not achieved
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces traditional mechanical checksum verification with cryptographic hash functions and digital signatures. The control device generates a cryptographic hash of the measurement data and signs it with its private key. The auxiliary device verifies the signature using the control device's public key, providing cryptographic proof of data integrity and authenticity that protects against intentional manipulation.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces cryptographic keys and hash values as intermediaries between the control device and auxiliary device. The cryptographic signature acts as a mediator that proves the authenticity of the measurement data without requiring direct trust between devices, enabling verification of data integrity through mathematical proof rather than direct connection.
2Reliability
If specialized components and point-to-point connections are used for integrity assurance, then data security is improved, but device complexity and architecture flexibility are reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The patent makes the control device perform multiple functions: it generates measurement data, creates cryptographic hashes, signs data with private keys, and verifies received data using public keys. The auxiliary device similarly performs measurement, hashing, and signature verification. This multi-functionality eliminates the need for separate specialized security components and simplifies the overall system architecture.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts the security verification function from the communication channel itself and places it in the application layer. Instead of requiring secure physical connections or dedicated security hardware, the integrity verification is achieved through cryptographic algorithms that can be implemented in software, separating security from the physical transmission medium.
3Reliability
If cryptographic operations are performed on the receiver side, then data verification is achieved, but computational burden on the receiver increases
Solution Approach 1:
The control device performs the computationally intensive cryptographic operations in advance by generating the digital signature using its private key before transmitting the measurement data. This preliminary action shifts the computational burden to the sender, allowing the receiver to perform only lighter verification operations using the sender's public key.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent employs asymmetric cryptography where the control device uses its private key for signing (computationally intensive one-way operation) and the auxiliary device uses the public key for verification (computationally lighter operation). This asymmetry in computational complexity between the two key operations allows the receiver to verify integrity with minimal energy consumption.
Data Source
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AI summary
The invention relates to a method for the integrity-assured transmission of at least one measurement data point from a control device to at least one auxiliary device communicatively connected to the control device. This transmission is cryptographically unsecured. On the receiver side, the measurement data point, or received measurement data sets or representations derived therefrom, are converted into a cryptographically secured representation. This cryptographically secured representation can be a cryptographic signature, but also a summary of the data set, e.g., in the form of a cryptographic hash value, which can then be transmitted via a secure connection – not necessarily a cryptographically secured connection.Depending on the embodiment, the method comprises a first step in which the measurement data set is transmitted without cryptographic security and subsequently transformed step by step into other representations until a cryptographically secured representation is generated. This representation is then checked for correspondence or consistency with a representation of the data stored or retained in the control device CTR. These measures allow, in particular, significant parts of the processing on the part of the control device CTR to be delayed, i.e., shifted to a period in which more computing resources are available than at the time of receiving the confirmation message. Alternatively, significant parts of the processing on the part of the control device CTR can also be shifted to a period in which computing resources are not otherwise required for an extended period.