Media Content Integrity Protection via Digital Signatures
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Solution Overview
Problem
Media content integrity is compromised when transmitted through untrusted networks, as it can be tampered with by malicious third parties, especially when delivered across multiple untrusted networks before reaching the viewer.
Innovation Solution
A service provider network digitally signs media content and transmits a manifest with a key using a separate communication channel, ensuring media content integrity by allowing media players to validate each frame using a public key, thereby preventing unauthorized content from being played.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If media content is transmitted through untrusted networks for global distribution, then accessibility and distribution reach are improved, but content integrity and security deteriorate due to potential tampering by malicious third parties
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by digitally signing the media content and generating authentication data before distribution. The service provider network signs the media content with a private key and creates authentication data that enables later verification, preventing tampering before the content reaches untrusted networks
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary authentication mechanism using digital signatures and authentication data. The service provider network acts as a trusted intermediary that signs the content and provides verification keys, allowing media players to authenticate content without requiring direct trust in the untrusted distribution networks
2Adaptability or versatility
If media content is distributed through multiple untrusted networks, then distribution flexibility is improved, but vulnerability to tampering and unauthorized injection increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements feedback through authentication verification. Media players continuously verify the authentication data against the signed content, providing feedback that detects any tampering. If authentication fails, the system can request retransmission or terminate playback, creating a closed-loop security mechanism
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies preliminary anti-action by pre-signing the content and embedding authentication data that actively counteracts potential tampering. The digital signature and authentication data are prepared in advance to prevent and detect unauthorized modifications before they can affect playback
3Reliability
If digital signing and authentication verification are implemented, then content security is improved, but system complexity and processing overhead increase
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication system is segmented into distinct components: the service provider network handles signing and generates authentication data, while media players handle verification. This segmentation allows each component to perform its specific function efficiently without requiring the entire system to be complex
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses copying by distributing authentication data and verification keys to multiple media players. Instead of requiring each player to have access to the private key or complex security infrastructure, the system copies the public verification information to all clients, simplifying their authentication process
Data Source
AI summary
A processing service of a provider network may protect media content from being tampered with when it is transmitted from the provider network/transcoder to untrusted networks (e.g., third-party networks/CDNs) and to a media player. The processing service (e.g., the transcoder) generates a public and a private key. The service uses the private key to digitally sign content portions (e.g., video frames) before distribution to untrusted CDNs. The provider network creates a manifest that includes the public key. To play the media content, the media player obtains a manifest that includes the public key (via a secure/trusted connection with the provider network). The media player may then obtain the media content from an untrusted edge server/CDN and validate it using the public key that was separately obtained from the manifest (to verify the content was not tampered with).