Media Integrity Validation via Asymmetric Key Segmentation
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Solution Overview
Problem
The challenge lies in validating the integrity and authenticity of media files, particularly in preventing malicious attribution of deepfake content, where altered audio/video content is misattributed to a reputable source, leading to trust and authenticity issues for consumers and originators.
Innovation Solution
A media publishing system utilizing asymmetric key cryptography, where a certificate with a public key and signature is obtained, and file integrity information is inserted into the media file. Each portion of the file calculates and encrypts a hash value with the private key, storing it as a signature within the media file, allowing for later verification of the file's integrity and origin.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If cryptographic validation is implemented for media files, then trust and authenticity are improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the media file into multiple portions and applies cryptographic validation to each portion independently. Hash values are calculated for individual portions (e.g., audio frames, video frames, or file segments) rather than the entire file, making the complexity manageable and distributed. Each portion gets its own integrity box with hash and signature, allowing parallel processing and reducing the computational burden on any single component.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent performs preliminary cryptographic actions during media file creation or processing. Hash values are calculated and signatures are generated in advance using the private key, with results stored in integrity boxes within the media file structure. This preliminary validation setup eliminates the need for complex real-time verification during playback or transmission, as the validation data is already prepared and embedded.
2Measurement precision
If hash values and signatures are stored for each portion, then measurement precision is improved, but loss of substance increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts only the essential cryptographic elements (hash values and signatures) from the full media file and stores them in compact integrity boxes. Instead of transmitting or storing entire media files for verification purposes, only the condensed hash representations are kept, which are significantly smaller in size. This extraction approach maintains verification precision while minimizing the additional data burden.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses cryptographic hash functions to create compact digital copies (hash values) of media file portions. These hash copies serve as verified representations of the original content, allowing integrity verification without needing to transmit or store the full media data. The hash values act as efficient substitutes that preserve verification capability while dramatically reducing data volume.
3Reliability
If cryptographic validation is implemented, then reliability is improved, but use of energy increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies cryptographic validation selectively to portions of the media file rather than requiring validation of every single byte. By dividing the media into portions and applying hash functions and signatures to each portion independently, the system achieves comprehensive integrity coverage while allowing for optimized processing. Verification can be performed on individual portions as needed, rather than requiring full-file cryptographic processing.
Data Source
AI summary
Described herein is a system and method for validating media integrity using asymmetric key cryptography utilizing a public/private cryptographic key pair. The private key is kept secret and is known to an originator and/or publisher of a media file. The public key is added to the media file and is used to validate integrity of the media file, that is, that content of the media file (e.g., portion(s), frame(s)) has not been altered since publication of the media file. By validating integrity of the media file, strong proof that the media file came from an owner of the keypair (e.g., had possession of the private key) can be obtained, for example, resolving issues of trust and/or authenticity common in altered content. In some embodiments, information regarding an origin of the content can further be determined.