Mediated Attribute Verification for Zero-Trust Resource Access
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing public-key cryptography systems lack sufficient security measures to prevent unauthorized access and lateral movement of malicious entities within trusted networks, leading to potential data breaches and unnecessary resource expenditure.
Innovation Solution
Implement a location attribute policy (LAP) server that verifies user attributes using a trusted ledger, generates a decryption key only after validating dynamic and static requirements, and uses a zero-trust model to ensure secure access to encrypted resources.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If public-key cryptography is used for access control, then basic security is provided, but additional security measures are needed to prevent unauthorized access and lateral movement within trusted networks
Solution Approach 1:
The access control system segments the decryption key into multiple shares using secret sharing schemes. Each share is distributed to different authorized entities, and a threshold number of shares is required to reconstruct the key. This segmentation prevents single-point compromise and enables fine-grained access control without requiring complex cryptographic protocols beyond standard public-key infrastructure.
Solution Approach 2:
A trusted ledger serves as an intermediary between the requestor and the encrypted resource. The ledger stores and verifies attribute proofs without exposing sensitive cryptographic material. This intermediary layer enables secure attribute verification and key share distribution while maintaining the simplicity of public-key cryptography for authentication.
2Reliability
If additional security measures are implemented beyond public-key cryptography, then unauthorized access is prevented, but compute resource expenditure increases
Solution Approach 1:
Attribute proofs and key shares are pre-computed and stored in the trusted ledger before access is needed. When a requestor needs access, the system only needs to verify pre-existing proofs and combine pre-computed key shares, rather than performing complex cryptographic operations in real-time. This preliminary action significantly reduces compute resource expenditure during the actual access operation.
Solution Approach 2:
The trusted ledger automatically verifies attribute proofs and manages key share distribution without requiring intensive computational resources from the access control server. The ledger's distributed nature enables self-service verification through cryptographic proofs, eliminating the need for complex trust verification computations and reducing overall system resource expenditure.
3Reliability
If attribute verification is performed before granting access, then access control security is enhanced, but the access process becomes more complex
Solution Approach 1:
The system replaces complex mechanical or procedural access control mechanisms with cryptographic proof verification. Instead of manual attribute checking or complex policy evaluation, the trusted ledger verifies attributes using cryptographic proofs and digital signatures. This substitution maintains strong access control while simplifying the verification process through mathematical rather than procedural complexity.
Data Source
AI summary
An access control system is disclosed for controlling access to a resource. A request is received by a location attribute policy (LAP) server to access an encrypted resource. The LAP server accesses a resource policy that identifies requirements for granting access to the encrypted resource, such as a list of attributes of the requestor that are required and a dynamic attribute requirement of the requestor. The LAP server receives a cryptographic proof from the computing device that the requestor possesses the attributes and validates the proof based at least on information obtained from a trusted ledger. Once the proof is validated, the LAP server provides a shared secret associated with the dynamic attribute requirement to a decryption algorithm. The decryption algorithm uses the dynamic attribute shared secret in combination with one or more attribute shared secrets from the requestor to generate a decryption key for the encrypted resource.