Memory Device Certificate Generation for Tamper Authentication
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing authentication methods for memory devices are ineffective in detecting post-manufacturing tampering or modifications, as they generate certificates that are not unique to individual devices, leading to potential counterfeit construction and security risks.
Innovation Solution
Generate a unique authentication certificate for memory devices based on identifiers of active components such as microcontrollers, ASICs, and memory devices, using a certificate generation process that incorporates these identifiers to ensure authenticity and detect tampering.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If existing authentication methods are used to generate certificates for memory devices, then the authentication process is simple, but the certificates are not unique to individual devices and cannot detect post-manufacturing tampering
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the authentication process by dividing the certificate generation into multiple components: collecting identifiers from multiple active components (memory device, microcontroller, ASIC), hashing these identifiers, and combining them to form a unique certificate. This segmentation ensures each component contributes to the overall authentication, making tampering detectable while maintaining a structured generation process.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies preliminary action by collecting and hashing identifiers from all active components during manufacturing or initial setup, before the device enters service. This pre-computation of cryptographic hashes and their combination creates a baseline certificate that can be later verified, enabling detection of any post-manufacturing changes without requiring complex real-time analysis.
2Productivity
If certificates are generated without incorporating active component identifiers, then the authentication process is fast, but counterfeit construction and post-manufacturing tampering cannot be detected
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary anti-action by pre-computing cryptographic hashes of active component identifiers and combining them into a certificate during manufacturing. This creates an immutable baseline that proactively prevents counterfeit construction and tampering detection failures, rather than attempting to detect these issues after they occur. The hash functions provide one-way protection that maintains speed while ensuring security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces cryptographic hash functions as intermediaries between the active component identifiers and the final certificate. These hash functions transform the raw identifiers into fixed-length, unique representations that can be efficiently combined and verified. This intermediary layer maintains authentication speed while providing robust protection against counterfeit risks through the mathematical properties of cryptographic hashing.
3Reliability
If multiple active component identifiers are collected and hashed to generate a unique certificate, then device authenticity and tampering detection are improved, but the authentication process becomes more complex
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies self-service by having the memory device system automatically collect identifiers from its own active components (memory device, microcontroller, ASIC), compute the cryptographic hashes, and generate the certificate without requiring external intervention. This self-contained process reduces operational complexity despite the multiple steps involved, as the system performs all authentication operations autonomously using its own internal resources and identifiers.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces manual or complex verification mechanisms with cryptographic hash-based authentication. Instead of requiring complex comparisons or manual verification of multiple component identifiers, the system uses mathematical hash functions to transform identifiers into unique, easily comparable certificate values. This substitution of mechanical verification with cryptographic mathematics simplifies the overall process while maintaining high reliability.
Data Source
AI summary
A processing device in a memory sub-system receives a request to generate a digital certificate associated with a memory device including a set of active components, where each active component of the set of active components is associated with an active component identifier. In response to the request, a set of active component identifiers are identified. Based on at least a portion of the set of active component identifiers, the digital certificate associated with the memory device is generated and provided to a host system, where the digital certificate is used to authenticate the memory device