Memory Purge Encryption Key Erasure

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Memory systems face challenges in securely erasing data from Replay Protected Memory Blocks (RPMB) without executing an erase command, particularly when access to encryption keys needs to be revoked to prevent decryption.

Innovation Solution

The memory system overwrites the encryption key stored in the RPMB and then performs a purge operation, transferring valid data to another portion of the memory system, effectively erasing the encryption key by executing an authenticated write and purge operation.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If an erase command is executed to remove data from RPMB, then data security is improved, but the device complexity increases and additional commands are required

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata securityVSAvoidcommand structure
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the erase functionality from a separate command into the existing purge operation. By integrating data removal capabilities into the purge command, the system eliminates the need for a dedicated erase command while maintaining security. The purge operation now handles both data transfer and removal functions that were previously requiring separate erase commands.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The purge operation is enhanced to serve multiple functions: it transfers valid data to new locations and simultaneously removes obsolete data from the RPMB. This multi-functional approach consolidates what would have been separate erase operations into the existing purge workflow, reducing command complexity while improving security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

2Reliability

If encryption keys are stored in RPMB for data encryption, then data security is improved, but the risk of key exposure increases if keys cannot be securely removed

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata securityVSAvoidkey exposure risk
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary data transfer before key removal. Valid data is copied to new locations in the RPMB first, ensuring data preservation. Only after successful transfer does the system proceed to purge the old key locations, preventing data loss while enabling secure key removal.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent converts the limitation of not having a dedicated erase command into a benefit by enhancing the purge operation. The purge command, originally designed for data management, is extended to handle secure key removal, turning a potential security vulnerability into a strengthened security mechanism.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

3Reliability

If a purge operation is performed to transfer data within RPMB, then data security is improved, but the operation time increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata securityVSAvoidpurge operation duration
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs partial purging by targeting only the specific portions of the RPMB that contain obsolete encryption keys, rather than purging the entire memory block. This selective approach transfers and removes only the necessary data segments, reducing the overall operation time while maintaining security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Data Source

PatentUS20240330519A1Purging data at a memory device
Publication Date: 2024.10.03 MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC
  • US20240330519A1 patent drawing
  • US20240330519A1 patent drawing
  • US20240330519A1 patent drawing

AI summary

Methods, systems, and devices for purging data from a memory device are described. A memory system may receive, from a host system, a command to write data to an address storing an encryption key in a first portion of the memory system that is configured to store secure information (e.g., a Replay Protected Memory Block). The encryption key may be configured to encrypt data associated with the host system that is stored in a second portion of the memory system. The memory system may then receive an indication of a purge command from the host system. The memory system may execute the purge command by transferring data from the first portion of the memory system to a third portion of the memory system configured to store secure information and erasing the data from the first portion of the memory system.