Message Routing Delay Mechanism for Spam Cost Shifting
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current methods for addressing spam, such as user filtering programs and legal measures, are ineffective due to high false hit rates, network bandwidth consumption, and the difficulty in shifting transaction costs back to spammers, allowing spam to overwhelm legitimate emails.
Innovation Solution
A system and method that selectively increases transaction costs for spammers by introducing delays, identifying and penalizing unknown recipient addresses, and using faux addresses to deter spam, thereby shifting costs back to the sender and reducing network burden.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If user spam filtering programs are used, then spam filtering is attempted, but false hits occur resulting in real messages being treated as spam
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces an intermediary system (the delay mechanism) between the sender and recipient that mediates the spam filtering process. Instead of relying on user-side filtering programs that directly block messages, the system uses a network-level delay mechanism that temporarily holds messages and allows legitimate senders to retry within a delay period while blocking spammers who exceed the delay threshold, thereby reducing false hits while maintaining filtering effectiveness
2Reliability
If spam filtering is implemented, then spam is blocked, but network bandwidth is consumed by filtering processes
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the spam filtering function from the network infrastructure and relocates it to the sender's end through the delay mechanism. By having spammers repeatedly attempt to send messages that are delayed and eventually blocked, while legitimate senders can retry within the delay period, the system reduces the need for continuous network-wide filtering processes, thereby decreasing network bandwidth consumption while maintaining spam blocking effectiveness
3Object-generated harmful factors
If transaction costs are increased for spammers, then spamming becomes costly, but legitimate email sending is also affected
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies a dynamic delay mechanism that adjusts the transaction cost based on the sender's behavior pattern. The delay period is temporarily applied to all senders, but legitimate senders who respect the delay can send emails successfully, while spammers who repeatedly attempt to send spam within the delay period face increasing costs. This dynamic approach allows the system to differentiate between legitimate and spamful sending behavior, making spamming costly while maintaining ease of operation for legitimate email sending
Data Source
AI summary
A system and method for increasing message transaction costs is disclosed. One basic embodiment of the method includes the elements of: receiving over a data link a request to route a message to a recipient address; calculating a delay period, in response to the request; dropping the data link; receiving over the data link a next request to route a message to a recipient address; dropping the data link, if the next request was received during the delay period; and routing the message referenced in the next request to the recipient address, if the delay period has expired. The system of the present invention, includes all means for implementing the method.