Microgrid Self-Triggering Control Against FDI Attacks
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Solution Overview
Problem
Microgrids face challenges in detecting and eliminating false data injection (FDI) attacks, which are difficult to detect and can waste communication and computing resources due to traditional distributed secondary control's fixed sampling period.
Innovation Solution
A microgrid self-triggering control method and system using a hash encryption algorithm, incorporating primary control based on droop control, secondary control for frequency recovery and fair active power distribution, and a distributed self-triggering control method to resist FDI attacks, with verification by Lyapunov stability method and simulation experiments.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Loss of energy
If traditional distributed secondary control with fixed sampling period is used, then the microgrid can maintain stable operation, but communication and computing resources are wasted due to frequent sampling
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements event-triggered sampling where controllers only sample and communicate data when specific triggering conditions are met, rather than using fixed periodic sampling. This reduces communication frequency and resource consumption while maintaining system stability through condition-based updates.
Solution Approach 2:
Each distributed generator equips itself with an event-triggered controller that autonomously determines when sampling and communication should occur based on local conditions, eliminating the need for centralized scheduling and reducing overall system resource consumption.
2Reliability
If traditional distributed secondary control is used, then the system operates continuously, but FDI attacks cannot be detected and eliminated
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a hash encryption algorithm as an intermediary layer in the communication between distributed generators. This cryptographic mechanism enables attack detection without requiring complex intrusion detection systems, as malicious data can be identified through hash verification failures.
Solution Approach 2:
The system preemptively applies hash encryption to communication data before transmission, creating a preventive defense mechanism that can detect FDI attacks before they compromise system operation, rather than reacting to attacks after detection.
3Productivity
If fixed sampling period is used, then control simplicity is maintained, but computing resources are wasted
Solution Approach 1:
The patent transitions from static fixed-period sampling to dynamic event-triggered sampling where the sampling interval adapts based on system conditions. The triggering conditions dynamically adjust when communication should occur, optimizing computing efficiency while maintaining control performance.
Data Source
AI summary
A microgrid self-triggering control method and system for resisting FDI attacks is provided. The method includes the following steps: S1: adopting primary control based on droop control for a microgrid; S2: designing a secondary control strategy of the microgrid, where the secondary control strategy includes frequency recovery and fair distribution of active power; and S3: designing a microgrid distributed self-triggering control method of a hash encryption method after considering the condition that the FDI attacks are injected into a secondary control communication link, so as to resist false malicious data in the microgrid and achieve secondary control. According to the microgrid self-triggering control method and system, a distributed secondary control target of the microgrid is achieved even under the FDI attacks, the injected malicious data can be quickly detected and eliminated, and the distributed secondary control communication network of the microgrid can be protected.