Mobile Device Security Against DoS via Parameter Defaulting
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Solution Overview
Problem
Mobile communication devices are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks due to unsecured over-the-air (OTA) messages, particularly in UMTS networks, where hackers can manipulate timer parameters like T3302 in non-integrity-protected reject messages, leading to disrupted registration processes and service denial.
Innovation Solution
Mobile communication devices are programmed to use a predetermined, secure value for parameters like T3302 instead of received values in non-integrity-protected messages, ensuring continuous network communication by ignoring or defaulting to a valid timer value.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the mobile communication device uses parameter values received in non-integrity-protected messages, then the device can process messages quickly without additional validation, but the device becomes vulnerable to DoS attacks where hackers can manipulate timer parameters like T3302 to disrupt registration processes
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by pre-storing valid parameter values (such as T3302 timer values) in the mobile communication device before receiving messages. When a non-integrity-protected message contains a parameter, the device compares it against the pre-stored valid values and only accepts matches. This preventive measure is implemented in advance to block potential DoS attacks before they can disrupt the registration process, rather than reacting after manipulation occurs.
2Reliability
If the mobile communication device implements integrity checking on all received messages, then the security against manipulated parameters is improved, but the communication efficiency and speed are reduced due to additional processing overhead
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by implementing integrity checking selectively rather than universally. Specifically, the device performs integrity validation only on non-integrity-protected messages that contain critical parameters like timer values (T3302). Messages that are already integrity-protected or do not contain vulnerable parameters are processed without additional checking. This targeted approach provides security where needed while maintaining communication efficiency for other message types.
Data Source
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AI summary
A method of operating a mobile communication device in a mobile telecommunication network, the method comprising the steps of the mobile communication device: receiving a non integrity-protected message with a parameter value included therein to beimplemented on the mobile communication device; using a predetermined value stored on the mobile communication device instead of the parameter value received.