Post-Quantum Secure Communication with Multi-KEM Forward Secrecy

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing secure communication protocols, such as TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, rely on classical public key infrastructure (PKI) algorithms like RSA, DH, and ECC, which are vulnerable to quantum computers, necessitating a shift to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to ensure long-term security, but current PQC algorithms have uncertainties and require multiple algorithms to enhance security.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a combination of at least two distinct post-quantum cryptography key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) algorithms, including lattice-based, code-based, and Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE), to derive multiple shared secret keys, ensuring security through redundancy and resistance to quantum computers.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If classical PKI algorithms (RSA, DH, ECC) are used for secure communication, then current security standards are met and protocols are efficient, but security is compromised against quantum computer attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against quantum attacksVSAvoidcryptographic protocol complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the cryptographic protocol into multiple independent PQC algorithm instances (first KEM algorithm, second KEM algorithm, third KEM algorithm) that operate in parallel. Each algorithm instance processes its own key encapsulation and decapsulation operations independently, then combines results through a key derivation function. This segmentation allows the system to maintain security through diversity while managing complexity through modular structure.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent creates a composite cryptographic system that combines multiple different PQC algorithm types (lattice-based, code-based, isogeny-based) into a unified security mechanism. Rather than relying on a single algorithm type, the system composite multiple algorithm families, each with different mathematical foundations, to achieve security that is resilient against quantum attacks targeting any single algorithm type.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #40Composite materials

2Reliability

If multiple PQC algorithms are combined to enhance security, then redundancy and security are improved, but computational overhead and processing time increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecryptographic security redundancyVSAvoidkey exchange processing time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent performs preliminary key generation and algorithm selection during the handshake phase before actual data transmission begins. The client and server pre-establish multiple key pairs using different PQC algorithms and pre-negotiate which algorithms to use for the session. This preliminary action ensures that when data transmission occurs, the heavy cryptographic operations have already been prepared, minimizing real-time processing delays.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements a flexible approach where multiple PQC algorithm instances are available but not all must be actively used in every session. The system can select a subset of algorithms based on negotiated parameters, allowing partial use of the full cryptographic suite. This enables the system to achieve adequate security with fewer active algorithms when possible, reducing computational overhead while maintaining the option to engage more algorithms when higher security is required.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

3Device complexity

If a single PQC algorithm is used for key encapsulation, then protocol simplicity is maintained, but security is vulnerable if that algorithm is compromised

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecryptographic protocol simplicityVSAvoidsecurity vulnerability to algorithm compromise
Core Design Contradiction:
Device complexityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies local quality by assigning different security characteristics to different parts of the cryptographic system. Each PQC algorithm instance (first, second, third KEM algorithms) can be selected and configured with different security parameters, key sizes, and computational characteristics appropriate to its specific role. This allows the system to optimize each algorithm instance for its particular function while maintaining overall system security through diversity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Solution Approach 2:

The patent prepares multiple independent cryptographic algorithm instances in advance, creating a cushion of security redundancy before any potential compromise occurs. By having multiple algorithm types already established and ready to use, the system ensures that if one algorithm is later found to be vulnerable or compromised, the other pre-prepared algorithms remain available to maintain security. This beforehand cushioning eliminates the need to reactively change algorithms after a vulnerability is discovered.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #11Beforehand cushioning (Prior cushioning)

Data Source

PatentUS20250330306A1System and Methods for Secure Communication Using Post-Quantum Cryptography
Publication Date: 2025.10.23 ADEIA EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES INC
  • US20250330306A1 patent drawing
  • US20250330306A1 patent drawing
  • US20250330306A1 patent drawing

AI summary

A server and a device can conduct a secure session with (i) multiple post-quantum cryptography (PQC) key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) and (ii) forward secrecy. The device can store a server static public key (PK.server) before establishing a secure session with the server. The device can use PK.server to encrypt a device ephemeral public key (ePK.device) into a first ciphertext. The first ciphertext can also include a device digital signature. The server can receive and decrypt the first ciphertext. The server can use the ePK.device to encrypt a server ephemeral public key (ePK.server) into a second ciphertext. The second ciphertext can also include a server digital signature. The device can receive and decrypt the second ciphertext. The device can encrypt application data into a third ciphertext using both PK.server and ePK.server. PK.server can support a first PQC algorithm and ePK.server can support a different, second PQC algorithm.