Multi-Priced Funding Rounds via Segmented Equity Pricing

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Solution Overview

Problem

The existing methods of raising investment capital through funding rounds are slow and inefficient, as early investors bear higher risks without adequate reward, and later investors are hesitant to invest due to uncertainty about the venture's funding status.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a multi-priced funding method with sequential rounds of equity shares, where each round is priced incrementally higher, allowing early investors to resell shares to later investors at higher prices, and utilizing a distributed networked computer system to manage and execute these transactions through smart contracts.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Productivity

If a single fixed price is used for equity shares in a funding round, then the pricing process is simple, but the investment pace is slow and investors cannot be adequately rewarded for assuming higher risk

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveinvestment paceVSAvoidpricing structure complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The funding round is divided into multiple price categories (first price category, second price category, etc.), where each category represents a distinct pricing tier. This segmentation allows different investors to be offered shares at different prices based on their investment timing and risk assumption, thereby accelerating the investment pace while providing adequate reward for early investors.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

Different price categories are assigned to different investor groups based on their specific circumstances. Early investors who assume higher risk are offered shares at lower prices, while later investors are offered shares at higher prices. This local differentiation ensures that each investor group receives appropriate pricing treatment matched to their risk profile and investment timing.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

2Reliability

If early investors are offered shares at a lower price to reward their risk assumption, then later investors can invest with confidence, but the company may raise less total capital

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvefunding adequacyVSAvoidtotal capital raised
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSQuantity of substance

Solution Approach 1:

The pricing structure is dynamic rather than static. The offering progresses through sequential price categories where the price per share increases from the first price category to the second price category and beyond. This dynamic pricing mechanism ensures that the company raises adequate total capital while still providing attractive pricing to early investors who assume higher risk.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The price parameter changes across different price categories. The second price category is explicitly defined as being at a higher price than the first price category. This parameter change allows the company to optimize the balance between rewarding early investors and raising sufficient total capital from the funding round.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Reliability

If multiple price categories are introduced to enable incremental pricing, then investor risk assumption is equitized, but the system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improverisk assumption equityVSAvoidfunding round management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The funding round is divided into multiple price categories (first price category, second price category, etc.), where each category represents a distinct pricing tier. This segmentation allows different investors to be offered shares at different prices based on their investment timing and risk assumption, thereby accelerating the investment pace while providing adequate reward for early investors.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The system incorporates feedback mechanisms to determine when to transition between price categories. The offering manager assesses the funding status and investor responses to decide when to move from the first price category to the second price category, ensuring that the pricing structure responds to actual market conditions and investor behavior.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

4Productivity

If a sequential multi-priced offering is implemented, then early investors can exit with a profit, but the transaction processing complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveinvestment efficiencyVSAvoidtransaction processing complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

An offering manager is introduced as an intermediary to administer the multi-priced funding round. This offering manager coordinates the transition between price categories, manages the allocation of shares across different categories, and facilitates the exit mechanisms for early investors. This intermediary role simplifies the overall transaction processing complexity while maintaining the benefits of sequential multi-priced offering.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS20230029345A1Incremental-priced funding rounds
Publication Date: 2023.01.26 DESCHENAUX MARC R
  • US20230029345A1 patent drawing
  • US20230029345A1 patent drawing
  • US20230029345A1 patent drawing

AI summary

A computerized system with hardware and specialized software components for developing, executing and administering multi-priced funding, the system providing a of first price category shares that can be purchased at a first price and a plurality of second price category shares that can be purchased at a second price at an incrementally higher offering price than the first price, wherein the second price category shares are offered for sale at a time after the first price category shares are sold and purchasers of the first price category shares can sell the first price category shares to purchasers of the second price category shares at the second price.