Multi-Rail Sparse Signal Control Against Fault Injection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing integrated circuits (ICs) are vulnerable to fault injection attacks due to modern circuit synthesis tools optimizing away security features, leading to decreased performance, increased cost, and reduced scalability.
Innovation Solution
Implementing secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals using multiple rails controlled by separate finite state machines (FSMs) to transmit critical signals, ensuring a minimum Hamming distance and resistance to circuit optimization.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If circuit synthesis tools are used to optimize IC design, then productivity and ease of manufacture are improved, but security against fault injection attacks deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The critical signal is segmented into multiple separate signal lines (e.g., 3 lines for a 2-bit signal) and transmitted through multiple rails. Each rail carries a portion of the encoded signal, and the segments are reassembled at the receiving end. This segmentation prevents circuit synthesis tools from optimizing away the security features while maintaining design productivity.
Solution Approach 2:
A sparsely encoded signal acts as an intermediary between the original critical signal and the transmitted data. The encoding scheme (e.g., using valid codewords with minimum Hamming distance) introduces redundancy that protects against fault injection attacks while allowing standard circuit synthesis tools to be used for optimization.
2Reliability
If multiple rails with sparsely encoded signals are implemented, then security against fault injection attacks is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The finite state machine (FSM) is designed to perform multiple functions: it encodes critical signals into sparsely encoded formats, controls the transmission across multiple rails, and handles decoding at the receiving end. This multi-functionality reduces the need for separate dedicated circuits for each operation, thereby managing device complexity while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
The signal encoding parameters are changed from standard binary representation to sparsely encoded formats with minimum Hamming distance. This parameter change increases security against fault injection attacks while the FSM efficiently manages the transformation, preventing excessive complexity growth.
3Reliability
If sparsely encoded signals with minimum Hamming distance are used, then security is improved, but manufacturing precision requirements increase
Solution Approach 1:
The sparsely encoded signal format provides a cushion of redundancy through minimum Hamming distance between valid codewords. This beforehand cushioning protects against manufacturing variations and signal integrity issues, as the encoded format can tolerate certain errors while maintaining security. The FSM ensures proper encoding to maintain this protective cushion.
Data Source
AI summary
Techniques, apparatuses, and systems for secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals are disclosed. Integrated circuits (ICs) may transmit various signals to manage interactions between circuit components of the IC. These critical signals are common targets for malicious attacks because, when altered, they can cause the IC to perform differently than is intended, and in some cases, bypass security measures. While various strategies may be used to protect against these attacks, modern circuit synthesis tools may optimize away these security measures, leaving the IC vulnerable to manipulation. In contrast, the secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals described herein utilizes multiple rails to transmit sparsely encoded critical signals. Each rail may be controlled by a separate finite state machine (FSM) to reduce vulnerabilities that may arise due to circuit synthesis, provide an adjustable solution that may be leveraged differently based on implementation, and provide comportability to different ICs.


