NAS Security Mode Verification for UE Capability Tampering

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Solution Overview

Problem

In mobile communications, an attacker can modify UE capability information during the attach procedure, leading to incorrect service provisioning due to lack of integrity protection in the attach request message, resulting in denial of service issues.

Innovation Solution

A method and apparatus for verifying UE capability information by using verification matching information, such as hash values and message authentication codes, to ensure consistency between UE and MME capabilities, preventing unauthorized modifications.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If integrity protection is not applied to attach request message, then the attach procedure is simple and fast, but the UE capability information can be modified by attacker leading to service denial

Engineering Contradiction:
ImproveUE capability information accuracyVSAvoidattach procedure complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by having the UE calculate and include a hash value of the attach request message before the MME processes the capability information. This preliminary hash calculation establishes a verification baseline that prevents subsequent unauthorized modifications, resolving the contradiction by adding minimal complexity at the point of data generation rather than throughout the entire processing flow.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements feedback through the MME calculating a second hash value based on the received attach request message and comparing it with the first hash value provided by the UE. This feedback mechanism verifies the integrity of UE capability information without requiring complex cryptographic protocols, thus improving reliability while maintaining procedural simplicity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Reliability

If the MME trusts UE capability information without verification, then the service provisioning is fast, but the MME may provide incorrect services due to attacker modification

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveservice provisioning correctnessVSAvoidverification time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent replaces complex cryptographic verification mechanisms with a simpler hash-based verification system. Instead of using full cryptographic protocols that would add significant processing time, the system uses hash values to verify integrity, achieving reliable service provisioning correctness with minimal time overhead.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent changes the verification parameter from complex cryptographic validation to simple hash value comparison. By using hash values as the verification parameter, the system achieves fast verification that ensures service provisioning correctness without introducing significant time delays.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Object-affected harmful factors

If the attacker modifies UE capability information, then the attacker can control UE service access, but the legitimate UE service is denied

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveman-in-the-middle attack preventionVSAvoidmessage verification complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the critical verification function from the complex attach procedure by separating the hash value verification as a distinct, simple step. This extraction allows the system to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks through a standalone verification mechanism that does not complicate the overall message processing flow.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces a hash value as an intermediary element between the UE and MME that facilitates trust without direct cryptographic interaction. This intermediary hash value serves as a simple mediator that prevents attacker modification while maintaining message verification simplicity throughout the communication protocol.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS12495070B2Mobile communication method, apparatus, and device
Publication Date: 2025.12.09 HUAWEI TECH CO LTD
  • US12495070B2 patent drawing
  • US12495070B2 patent drawing
  • US12495070B2 patent drawing

AI summary

The present disclosure relates to mobile communications technologies, and in particular, to a mobile communication method, apparatus, and device. The method includes: receiving, by user equipment UE, a non-access stratum NAS security mode command message from a mobility management entity MME, where the NAS security mode command message carries first verification matching information used to verify UE capability information received by the MME; determining, by the UE based on the first verification matching information, whether the UE capability information received by the MME is consistent with UE capability information sent by the UE to the MME; and if the UE capability information received by the MME is consistent with the UE capability information sent by the UE to the MME, sending, by the UE, a NAS security mode complete message to the MME.