Server Authenticity Verification Using Nested Proof Chains
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing server verification methods fail to address the technical challenges of certificate injection attacks, where existing systems are vulnerable to server verification methods fail to verify the authenticity of the server's possession of a trusted key, leading to potential security breaches in server verification. Existing systems lack the ability to securely verify the authenticity of the server's possession of a trusted key, which can result in unauthorized access and data breaches.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a chain of nested proofs, where the authentication challenge includes an indication of a first public key of a first keypair, a first signature of a first private key, and one or more second signatures of one or more second keypairs, determining whether the first public key is a trusted key pinned by the client device, and validating the authentication challenge based on determining that the at least one signature of the one or more second signatures of the one or more second private keys can be validated by the trusted key.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional server verification methods are used, then the verification process is simple, but the system is vulnerable to certificate injection attacks and cannot securely verify server authenticity
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements a nested proof structure where the authentication challenge contains multiple layers of signatures. The first signature verifies the first public key, and the second signature verifies the first signature using a second public key, creating a nested verification chain that ensures server authenticity while maintaining systematic organization of the verification process
Solution Approach 2:
The server performs preliminary actions by pre-computing and including multiple signatures in the authentication challenge before the client performs verification. The server signs the first public key with its first private key, then signs the first signature with its second private key, preparing the verification data in advance to enable reliable verification without increasing client complexity
2Object-affected harmful factors
If key pinning with multiple signatures is implemented, then security against certificate injection attacks is improved, but the authentication challenge structure becomes more complex
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication challenge is segmented into distinct components: a first public key, a first signature generated by the first private key, and a second signature generated by the second private key. This segmentation allows the client to verify each component separately, making the security mechanism more robust against certificate injection attacks while maintaining manageable structural complexity
Solution Approach 2:
The first signature acts as an intermediary between the first public key and the second signature. The second signature verifies the first signature, creating a chain of trust where each layer authenticates the previous layer, thereby preventing certificate injection attacks while organizing the complex verification structure into manageable segments
Data Source
AI summary
An identity management system may support an authentication server. According to techniques described herein, a client device may receive an authentication challenge from the authentication server. The authentication challenge may include an indication of a first public key of a first keypair, a first signature of a first private key of the first keypair, and second signatures of second private keys of second keypairs. The client device may determine whether the first public key is a trusted key that is pinned by the client device. The client device may determine, based on determining that the first public key is not the trusted key that is pinned by the client device, whether at least one signature of the second signatures can be validated by the trusted key. The client device may validate the authentication challenge based on determining that the at least one signature can be validated by the trusted key.