Network-Bound Encryption for Trusted Execution Environment Recovery

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Solution Overview

Problem

Modern computing systems face security challenges in persistently storing encrypted data, as decryption keys stored in local or centralized key stores become a primary attack surface for malicious actors, especially in distributed systems like cloud computing, where sensitive data can be copied and attacked externally.

Innovation Solution

The technology enables network-bound encryption by using a key establishment service that allows devices to derive cryptographic keys without storing a persistent copy, using asymmetric key pairs to establish encryption and decryption keys, ensuring that keys are not transmitted in encrypted or decrypted form and remain unknown to the device executing the key establishment service.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If decryption keys are stored in local or centralized key stores, then data access is enabled, but the attack surface is increased and security is compromised

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata securityVSAvoidattack surface
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the decryption key from persistent storage by using ephemeral execution environments that generate and destroy keys dynamically. The key establishment service derives decryption keys in memory without writing them to disk, and the ephemeral execution environment is terminated after use, automatically destroying any residual key material. This removes the persistent attack surface while maintaining data accessibility.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The system performs preliminary key establishment before data access is needed. The key establishment service pre-generates encryption keys and distributes encrypted data, but the decryption keys are only derived temporarily when the ephemeral execution environment is activated. This preliminary action separates key generation from key storage, eliminating the need for persistent key stores.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Adaptability or versatility

If decryption keys are distributed to multiple devices, then data accessibility is improved, but security is compromised as keys become vulnerable to external attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata accessibilityVSAvoidexternal attack vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The key establishment service acts as an intermediary that enables multiple devices to access encrypted data without distributing decryption keys. Each device independently derives its own decryption key by interacting with the key establishment service using its unique identifier. This mediator approach maintains data accessibility across devices while preventing key distribution and the associated security risks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

Each device has a unique local quality in the form of its device-specific identifier that enables it to derive a unique decryption key from the same encrypted data. This allows every device to access the data locally without needing to share or store a common decryption key, thereby maintaining accessibility while eliminating the security vulnerability of key distribution.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

3Ease of operation

If cryptographic keys are transmitted between devices, then key establishment is achieved, but transmission interception and attacks become possible

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvekey establishmentVSAvoidtransmission interception
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent replaces the mechanical system of key transmission with a mathematical derivation system. Instead of transmitting cryptographic keys over the network, each device independently derives the decryption key through mathematical operations involving its device identifier and the key establishment service. This substitution eliminates the transmission interception vulnerability while maintaining ease of key establishment.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

4Duration of action of stationary object

If persistent storage of encryption keys is implemented, then data recovery is enabled, but the attack surface is increased

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata persistenceVSAvoidattack surface
Core Design Contradiction:
Duration of action of stationary objectVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system uses disposable ephemeral execution environments that are created, used, and destroyed in a single operational cycle. Each environment generates decryption keys temporarily, performs data recovery operations, and then terminates, automatically destroying all key material. This disposable approach enables data persistence and recovery while eliminating the need for persistent key storage that would create an attack surface.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #27Cheap short-living objects (Disposable)

Data Source

PatentUS11949775B2Network bound encryption for recovery of trusted execution environments
Publication Date: 2024.04.02 RED HAT LLC
  • US11949775B2 patent drawing
  • US11949775B2 patent drawing
  • US11949775B2 patent drawing

AI summary

The technology disclosed herein provides network bound encryption that enables a trusted execution environment to persistently store and access recovery data without persistently storing the decryption key. An example method may include: transmitting combined key data that is based on a cryptographic key data of a second computing device to a third computing device; deriving a cryptographic key from combined key data received from the third computing device, the received combined key data being based on the cryptographic key data of the second computing device and cryptographic key data of the third computing device; and causing the trusted execution environment to use the cryptographic key to access sensitive data on a persistent storage device.