Network Steering Integrity Using UE-Verified MAC Authentication

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing technologies lack a secure and reliable method for ensuring that Visited Public Land Mobile Networks (VPLMNs) do not alter or remove Network Steering Information intended for User Equipments (UEs) from Home Public Land Mobile Networks (HPLMNs, and there is no efficient way for HPLMNs to verify delivery of this information.

Innovation Solution

A method and system where a UE generates a configuration key (Kconf) from a home network root key (Kausf) to protect Network Steering Information with Message Authentication Codes (MAC-1 and MAC-2), allowing the UE to verify integrity and acknowledge receipt to the HPLMN, ensuring the VPLMN has not altered the information.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Loss of information

If VPLMN relays Network Steering Information from HPLMN to UE, then information delivery is enabled, but information integrity cannot be guaranteed

Engineering Contradiction:
ImproveNetwork Steering Information integrityVSAvoidsecurity mechanism complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Loss of informationVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The HPLMN signs the Network Steering Information with a MAC-1 before transmitting it to the VPLMN. This preliminary authentication action ensures that when the VPLMN relays the information to the UE, the integrity is already protected, allowing the UE to verify authenticity without adding complex real-time security mechanisms.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces MAC-1 as an intermediary authentication element that bridges the HPLMN and VPLMN trust relationship. The VPLMN acts as a mediator that forwards the pre-authenticated information without needing to verify it itself, simplifying the security architecture while maintaining integrity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If HPLMN steers UE to specific VPLMN, then network control is improved, but delivery verification is not possible

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveinformation delivery reliabilityVSAvoiddelivery verification operation
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

The UE verifies the MAC-1 on received Network Steering Information and provides feedback by sending an acknowledgement message with MAC-2 back to the HPLMN. This feedback loop allows the HPLMN to confirm successful delivery and authentication, improving reliability while keeping the operation simple through automated verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

3Reliability

If UE receives Network Steering Information from VPLMN, then information access is enabled, but alteration detection is not possible

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveinformation authenticityVSAvoidinformation alteration detection
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDifficulty of detecting and measuring

Solution Approach 1:

The HPLMN pre-computes the MAC-1 based on the Network Steering Information and transmits it together with the information to the VPLMN, which then forwards both to the UE. This preliminary computation allows the UE to detect any alterations by verifying the MAC-1 without needing complex detection mechanisms.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS20250365575A1Securing network steering information
Publication Date: 2025.11.27 TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL)
  • US20250365575A1 patent drawing
  • US20250365575A1 patent drawing
  • US20250365575A1 patent drawing

AI summary

According to certain embodiments, a method by a user equipment (UE) for securing network steering information includes transmitting a registration request to a Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN). Upon successful authentication by an authentication server function (AUSF), a home network root key is generated. A protected message comprising Network Steering Information is received from a first network node. The protected message is protected using a configuration key (Kconf) and a first Message Authentication Code (MAC-1). The configuration key (Kconf) is determined from the home network root key, and the UE verifies the MAC-1. Based on the Kconf and the MAC-1, it is verified that the VPLMN did not alter Network Steering Information. An acknowledgement message, which is protected with a second Message Authentication Code (MAC-2), is transmitted to a Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN).